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PREFACE 
Within the last decade state-of-the-art cable television 
has gone from an unsuccessful, premature proposal in Virginia, 
to operative franchises in several jurisdictions , including 
Richm::m.d, Henrico, Chesterfield, Arlington, and Alexandria. 
There are also a number of franchises which have been in operation 
for many years and which are intended largely for reception 
improvement with sone minimal extra services, such as those in 
Petersburg, Hopewell and Colonial Heights. It is proposed here 
to raise significant issues which could have been addressed by 
Virginia state and local government as to the regulation of this 
rapid growth of cable television in the Cormnnwealth, especially 
given the trend toward deregulation at the Federal level which 
might leave regulatory responsibility with the state and loca-
lities. Examples from the governmental response to that growth 
will be used to dem:mstrate the need for a comprehensive study 
of regulatory alternatives. They will also show that to a 
significant extent, Virginia has already cormrl.tted itself to a 
regulatory scheire which apparently is to regulate in the public 
interest, but which, in fact, neither has the resources nor the 
authority to do so. Further, it will be apparent that this 
decision has been made largely by default. The Virginia General 
i 
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Assembly has failed to act, either through ignorance of the 
potential of the medium, or a reluctance to regulate or delegate 
authority to localities to do so. Only the barest regulatory 
framework for local governmental :initiative has been promul-
gated, and only a minimal corrmit:rrent has been ma.de to giving 
localities the resources necessary to exercise that responsi-
bility. The Conm:mwealth consequently finds itself with a cable 
regulatory scheme which is neither fully relevant to the 
characteristics of the iredium or capable of fostering the public 
interest. 
This study will involve necessarily a description of 
some of the major aspects of the legal and political environment 
within which governments cooperated in, reacted to, or :initiated 
this process. Further, the extent to which certain feasible and 
legal options were considered in an effort to create a sophisti-
cated system reflective of community needs will be noted, as 
will the legal problems of the largely irrelevant process of 
local governmental franchis:ing. It will be necessary to address 
briefly certain other points, such as the technical possibilities 
of cable television at this time and its likely future develop-
ment, comparison of the systems offered and chosen in the recent 
Virginia experience with the state-of-the-art, the economic 
factors limiting the feasibility of particular systems attractive 
to multiple system operators (MSO's), and the social and political 
implications of choices ma.de :in the franchising and regulatory 
process. 
iii 
Having addressed these subjects, it will be possible to 
assess the impact of the legal and political environment upon 
regulation of cable television by state and local goverrment in 
Virginia, with the focus being on a comparison of the alternatives 
available with actual results. Here questions shall be raised 
as to the appropriate roles of state and local regulation; as to 
the rationale for authorizing local governmental regulation on 
the basis of the franchising process and the relevance of principles 
of franchise law to the cable television industry; and even as 
to the relevance of traditional Virginia local government law to 
the attainment of conmmity cable television objectives. This 
shall require examination of the legal options, such as regional 
franchising and deregulation, taken by other jurisdictions, both 
nationally and in Virginia; of case law precedent, both for 
franchising generally (e.g., Cablecom-General of Virginia, Inc. 
v. City of Richm:md, et al. ) , and for such related considerations 
as antitrust law (e.g., Comnunity Corrrnunications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, Colorado), privacy protection, whether against private 
or public owners, First Amendment principles, and local govern-
ment law (e.g., Virginia's Dillon Rule). It shall be necessary 
to analyze whether or not under Virginia law cable television is 
to be treated as a public utility or a luxury, a public improve-
ment or a conmercial enterprise, and the implications of such 
decisions for local governmental regulation. Based upon this 
foundation, the task then will be to point to the weaknesses 
iv 
found in the legal tools available to Virginia local government 
in decisionrnak.ing on such i~sues, and to suggest that this 
reflects a failure of the legal and political system itself to 
meet the challenge of a rapidly developing and potentially 
important new technology. 
No effort will be made to describe a IIDdel regulatory 
scheme for Virginia and its localities. Rather, this study will 
explore the issues to be addressed in developing such a program, 
the possible benefit to the public interest in doing so, the 
lack of initiative on the issue, and limitations inherent in any 
such regulatory effort. The objective will be to raise impor-
tant issues not yet addressed in a developing field. To respond 
to those issues would be premature. It is not premature, how-
ever, to demonstrate the necessity for a comprehensive analysis 
of this issue. In fact, in Virginia it may be too late, since a 
number of significant franchises have already been let. This 
study will derronstrate that no such decisionmaking process has 
as yet been carried out in the Corrm:mwealth, and that signifi-
cant long term comnitments have been ITade without such guidance. 
Experiences from several jurisdictions with different cable 
television records, and located in three of the state's Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Northern Virginia, the Tricities, 
and the Richm:md area, will be discussed to illustrate the state 
and local response to such issues and the regulatory status of 
the medium at this point. The thesis of this study is that 
state government has defaulted in its regulatory responsibility 
v 
by leaving regulation to the efforts of local governments which 
have neither the legal auth~rity, the technical expertise, nor 
the political inclination to do so effectively. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GABIE 'IEIEVISION IN VIRGINIA 
Cable television in Virginia represents a cross section 
of the medium nationally, consisting of both older reception 
improvement systems, such as that in Damascus, which was begun 
in 1949; and nrultiservice systems in excess of thirty channel 
capacity currently under construction or recently operational, 
as in Richm:md and Arlington. As might be expected from a 
medium developing over thirty years of changing objectives and 
technology, system size varies significantly. Operational 
systems range from the very small, such as Rich Creek with fifty 
subscribers, to those of rroderate sizes, as in Roanoke with 
eighteen thousand, five hundred subscribers. Systems under 
construction have even greater potential size, as in Arlington, 
with a franchise area population of over one hundred, seventy-
five thousand. As of 1980, at least eighty-five systems were 
operational or in the advanced planning or construction phase in 
the Corrm:mwealth. Of these, however, at least sixty-two use 
twelve channels or fewer. Such reception improvement systems 
are not the main subject of this study, since they no longer 
represent the state-of-the-art. Also, they were established 
primarily for television reception purposes, while to call the 
state-of-the-art systems television is alrrost a misnomer. 
Actually, the focus of this paper is the developing cable 
1 
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infonnation mediun. Two such systems in the Tricities area will 
be noted, however, for cornparati ve purposes. Of those sixty-two 
basic systems, five have gone into operation since 1977, and 
twelve have a capacity, which is not fully utilized, of IIDre 
than twelve channels. Only two systems, however, Haysi with 
three and Jonesville with eight, have less than a twelve channel 
capacity. Only nine systems developed before the current stage 
of growth began in 1977 have and use a capacity beyond twelve 
channels,and these include the extraordinary situation presented 
by the Reston planned corrmun.ity system. Clearly, the nature of 
the mediun's developIIEilt in Virginia changed dramatically in the 
late 1970's.l 
For the comparative purposes of this paper, the cable 
television experience in three markets: Tricities (the Cities 
of Petersburg, Hopewell, and Colonial Heights), NortheTil Virginia 
(the Cotm.ties of Arlington and Fairfax, and the Cities of 
Alexandria and Fairfax), and the Richm:md Metropolitan area (the 
City of Richm:md and the Cotm.ties of Henrico and Chesterfield) 
will be examined. The franchising process was conducted in 
these markets at different tines, t.mder different social, 
political and legal conditions, and at different stages in 
industry developIIEtlt. Emphasis will be placed on the City of 
Richrrond, since the process there exernplied several of the 
shortcomings of the current Virginia experience with state-of-
the-art systems. NortheTil Virginia will exhibit experiences 
lBroadcasting--Cable Yearbook 1980 (Washington, D.C.: 
Broadcasting Publishers, Inc., 1980), pp. G261-G267. 
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with similar systems, but with somewhat rrore sophisticated, if 
not much rrore successful, an. approach. The older twelve channel 
systems of the Tricities area are examined primarily for derron-
stration of the challenge of the developing cable industry, 
which challenge tjemands both flexibility and resources apparently 
beyond many Virginia local governments, and for the consequences 
of these deficiencies. 
The Northern Virginia Experience 
NLnnerous inquiries from cable system operators to the 
Arlington County administration prior to 1970 led the county to 
request that the General Assembly authorize Virginia counties 
specifically, as well as other local jurisdictions, to franchise 
and regulate the cable television industry. The minimal response 
was the passage of Va. Code§ 15.1-23.1, which shall be mentioned 
later. Upon completion of a study by the Arlington Public 
Utilities Conrnission, which had as one of its objectives an 
ordinance which was ''flexible and would give the County the 
tools to protect the public interest in the face of changing 
teclm.ology," the Council passed its cable television ordinance 
on February 13, 1971. 
Solicitation of bids from over sixty finns was issued on 
Jtme 15, 1971, and five applications were received from Arlington 
Telecomm.mications Corporation (ARIEC), Arlington Corrmmity 
Television Co. , Inc. (ARCOM) , Northern Virginia Cable Centers 
(NVCC), TelePrompter (TPT) and the Corporation for Systems 
Research (ARSYSTEMS), four m:mths later. Several public hearings 
4 
and work sessions were held by the Corrmission, which refused to 
meet in executive session wi,,th any of the applicants, and rankings 
and recorrmendations were presented to the Board of Supervisors 
on January 10, 1972. A public hearing in March resulted in 
referral to the PUC for additional information. This process, 
in which any applicant was pennitted participation, resulted in 
a PUC recorrrnendation in Hay that a "conditional certificate" be 
granted to ARTEC, which the Board granted on August 5. In 
September, Warren Braum was hired as negotiator to assist in 
development of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 
consideration of numerous drafts of which followed. A Certificate 
was awarded to ARTEC on March 3, 1973, and an application in May 
filed with the Federal Comm.mi.cations Corrmission (FCC) for a 
Certificate of Corrpliance. Final authorization did not cone 
until August 19, 1975, primarily because of issues raised by 
Washington broadcasting stations. AR1EC came into full com-
pliance with the Cable Ordinance on December 16, 1975, by 
posting the required bond.2 
Initial service by the three lu.mdred, sixty mile, thirty-
six channel system with six goverrrrrental educational channels 
and one for public access, was delayed until July, 1978, pri-
marily because of financing difficulties.3 At its opening, FCC 
2rnterview with Jerry K. Emrich and Charles G. Flynn, 
Arlington County, Virgiriia, 21 November 1980; Washington Post, 
16 July 1978, sec. C, p. l; and Washington Post, 7 January 1979, 
sec. K, p. 5. 
3washington Post, 7 January 1979, sec. K, p. 5; and 
Washington Post, 9 February 1978, sec. Va., p. 1. 
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Comnissioner Joseph Fogarty characterized ARIEC as a prototype 
for future systems nationally, with its services for colID.ty 
government and schools and corrmunity infonnation, programning 
and shoppers guides and traffic signals.4 Two years later, 
before completion of the system, the Board of Supervisors 
deregulated ARTEC rates, despite service complaints, despite the 
fact that access canrritments had not been IIEt, and despite the 
fact that rate regulation was perhaps the rrost effective regu-
latory power of the Board. AR'IEC contended that lack of public 
access had resulted primarily from the fact that priority had 
been given to the completion of wiring. In support of deregulation, 
it was contended that cable television was not a rronopoly, 
similar services being available from broadcast nEdia in the 
Washington area; and that being the case, that philosophical 
considerations which the Board folID.d persuasive should dictate a 
free market. Also of importance was the fact that, even given 
the availability of a public utilities conrnission that would 
make it one of the rrost capable of Virginia jurisdictions, 
complex rate regulation was probably beyond the colID.ty staff's 
resources. The Board did retain the authority to reinstitute 
regulation. It was interesting to note that at the saIIE t:i.rre, 
ARTEC was indicating an interest in renegotiation of terms re-
quiring creative programning and public access. 5 
4washington Post, 19 July 1978, sec. D, p. 2; and 
Washington Post, 7 January 1979, sec. K, p. 5. 
5washington Post, 29 JlID.e 1980, sec. A, p. 13; and 
Washington Post, 10 July 1980, sec. Va. , p. 6. 
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While the Arlington .franchise awaited FCC approval, City of 
Alexandria officials considered initiating a cable franchise, but 
failed to do so when little interest developed. In 1978, however, 
solicitations were requested, and three companies, including an 
ARTEC subsidiary and the Alexandria Cablevision Company (ACC) , 
submitted bids in 1979.6 
Interestingly, the issue of rate regulation, as opposed to 
free market rates set in competition with other IIEdia, was in-
volved in the Alexandria procedure from the beginning. That 
city's Council only retained the option for the Cable Admini-
strator to regulate, upon request of Council. This was apparently 
in agreement with the position that rate regulation could increase 
the influence of politics on the franchising process, since only 
those with enough political power to get rate increases would 
bother to apply.7 
Just as would be the case in Richrrond, the primary factor 
considered in awarding the Alexandria franchise, aside from 
political pressure, was the financial ability of the bidders to 
perfonn, one difference being, however, that it was a local 
citizens group, the Consumer Affairs COITITiission, which advocated 
this position strongly in conjunction with the consultant. In 
doing so, it is interesting that one of the few economic advan-
tages of regional systems was found to be true in the Alexandria 
6washington Post, 15 April 1978, sec. B, p. 1; Alexandria, 
Virginia, Ordinance 2383, 26 June 1979; and Washington Post, 
5 March 1979, sec. C, p. 1. 
7washington Post, 28 June 1978, sec. B, p. 7. 
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system, that being that the ARTEC subsidiary had no need to build 
an additional broadcasting !'.ower in Alexandria, which the other 
bidders would. 8 In the end, this and other regional considerations 
did not succeed. Perhaps they were even a hindrance for ARTEC, 
or, as Council member Robert L. Calhoun stated, "I would like us 
to do som=thing on our own in this city rather than be a part of 
an empire."9 Interjurisdictional rivalries have often constituted 
the major obstacle to a regional system in Northern Virginia.10 
ALTEC was given the highest rating by the city's cable 
television administrator and its financial consultant, based on 
financial strength, m:magernent experience, realistic projections, 
and public service advantages, including a two-way capability. 
Council, however, detennined to award the franchise to ACC, but 
def erred the award until additional infonna.tion could be obtained 
concerning what the city's consultant characterized as "serious 
deficiences" in its financial arrangements. Finally, on June 19, 
1979, the franchise was awarded to ACC. In a due process com-
plaint that was also heard in Richm:md, ALTEC severely criticized 
Council for receiving additional infonna.tion from one bidder after 
the deadline for bid submissions, but net only with an opinion of 
the City Attorney that Council was within the law in doing so. In 
an extraordinary action, the successful bidder ACC also corrplained 
8washington Post, 8 March 1979; sec. B, p. 5. 
~ashington Post, 20 June 1979, sec. B, p. 1. 
lOinterview, Emrich and Flynn; Interview, Maston T. Jacks 
and Michelle R. Evans, Alexandria, Virginia, 21 November 1980; 
and Interview, Phil Tyman, Washington, D.C., 13 November 1980. 
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about due process violations by the City's staff and consultant 
during the process.11 Both complaints, however tmfounded legally, 
• 
point to the need for the type of franchising guidelines required 
later by Chesterfield and Falls Church.12 Not only were such 
procedures absent in the Alexandria case, but a new Council took 
office in the middle of the award, leading to such problems as 
suggested additional tenns in the perfonnance contract concerning 
the City's right to purchase the system if its perfonnance were 
fotmd inadequate. The contract was signed, however, on July 26, 
1979,13 and the stringing of cable finally began in July, 1980, 
for a thirty-five channel "tiered" system which would allow 
flexibility in consumer choice of service, and which would even-
tually provide such two-way service as alanns as well as channels 
for leasing for business and personal use. 14 The fact that the 
system is two-way "active," as opposed to being susceptible to 
later conversion to two-way, constitutes a significant system 
advantage, despite the fact that this may have resulted from a bid 
error.15 Service in sane parts of Alexandria began in late 
October, 198o.16 
llwashington Post, 13 June 1979, sec. B, p. 8; Washington 
Post, 27 June 1979, sec. C, p. l; and Washington Post, 4 July 1979, 
sec. C, p. 7. 
12rnterview, Stephen L. Micas, Chesterfield Courthouse, 
Virginia, 20 Noverrber 1980; and Falls Church, Virginia, "Cable 
Television Franchising Procedures Ordinance," 1980. 
13washington Post, 10 July 1979, sec. C, p. 3. 
14washington Post, 10 July 1980, sec. Va., p. 6. 
15rnterview, Jacks and Evans. 
16Tuid.; and Municipal Highlights: City of Alexandria, 
Virginia, Noverrber 1980, p. 6. 
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On October 23, 1978, the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors 
voted unaninnusly to seek bids for a consulting finn to develop a 
cable television ordinance, and to authorize the hiring of a 
"special manager" to work as liaison between the staff and the 
consultant. It was anticipated that the ordinance would be drafted 
within six months. 
Valid concern that the process be cautiously conducted was 
expressed, despite some consternation that the county was not 
already further along towards cable service. There was even some 
sentiment for observing the experience in Arlington before pro-
ceeding too far, and perhaps for waiting until late 1979 to go out 
for bids. It was recognized by mmy, as Supervisor Martha V. 
Pennino stated, that the cable franchising issue presented "one of 
the most important decisions we will ever m:ike; '' or put mre 
dramatically by one supervisor, that "this is either the greatest 
thing coming down the pike for Fairfax or a horrible IlDilSter." 
Unfortunately, county profit, in the nature of a business privilege 
tax, was a major motive fran the beginning. AR'IEC was one of the 
five £inns initially interested.17 
As late as May, 1979, one of the mst respected national 
cable television consultants, Malarkey, Taylor and Associates of 
Washington, D. C., evaluated Fairfax County as a marginal risk for 
a franchise. Due to a low population density and local require-
ments for much underground work, it was anticipated that a system 
could expect approximately ten years of losses. Both Arlington 
17washington Post, 26 October 1978, sec. Va., p. 18. 
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and Alexandria had population densities of nore than twice that of 
Fairfax County. It was note@l, however, that the County was a 
prestige area near the nation's capital, with a relatively high 
per capita income. As a means of mitigating capital expenditures, 
it was recorrmmded that the county be divided into three service 
areas, ideally with a different franchise in each. The unincor-
porated, planned cormn.mity of Reston, within ·which Warner-Annex 
Cable Corp. already operated a system without a franchise, 'WOuld 
constitute one area, with the rest of the county being split into 
two areas. No plans involving subdistricting or networking were 
involved. 
Rapid technological developm=nts within the past year have 
made possible a substantial increase in available services to 
potential consurrers which are unavailable from broadcast media. 
The resulting increases in the market for cable has made the 
population density question ID.Jch less important.18 The three 
franchise areas are being retained, but the two major franchises 
will probably now go to the sane company. With one franchisee, 
there could be First Amendment problems with requiring different 
programning in subdistricts. 
Any earlier misgivings about the feasibility of the system 
have not been evidenced by a lack of interest on the part of the 
potential operators. There are at least eighteen which have 
18washington Post, 1 May 1979, sec. C, p. 2; Washington Post, 
8 April 1980, sec. C, p. l; Washin~ton Post, 27 December 1979; and 
Interview, Richard A. Golden, Fair ax County, Virginia, 19 November 
1980. 
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exhibited interest at some point. The Board of Supervisors 
approved, on April 7, 1980, the three district plan, and at the 
same time inexplicitably refused a proposal to give a citizen's 
comnittee a role in awarding the franchise. 19 Since that tiIIE, 
whether it was involved with the Board's decision on citizen 
input or not, that decision may have been indirectly vindicated. 
As a result of what at least appeared to the Board to be an 
especially unfortunate example of "rent-a-citizen" franchise 
practices, a controversy has developed over acceptance by the 
Fairfax County Arts Council, a private group also accepting 
county funds, of one percent interest in the subsidiary of 
Storer Corrnrunications. In tenns of appearances, the problem was 
not mitigated to any significant degree by the fact that the 
canpany contended that no Arts Council lobbying was intended, 
and that the stock was only in return for programn:ing advice. 20 
The county has since adopted one of the strictest cable financial 
ownership disclosure ordinances in the nation. 21 
On a less hopeful note, however, the Board has cone to the 
conclusion that they are incapable, even with one of the nnst 
sophisticated local staffs in. the Corrm:mwealth, of judging techno-
logical factors. Also, the originally set deadline of December 
19, 1980, for the receiving of bids to the Board has apparently 
gone by the board as the governing body has called for a report on 
19washington Post, 8 April 1980, sec. C, p. 1. 
2CJwashington Post, 22 July 1980, sec. C, p. 1. 
2lwashington Post, 8 August 1980, sec. C, p. 1. 
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possible public ownership. Despite Dillon Rule, antitrust, and 
other legal problems with public local ownership, this should not 
be surprising, given the Fairfax reputation for liberal inter-
pretation of Virginia local government authority.22 1his study 
could prove interesting though, since it could point to the fact 
that most of these problems could be mitigated by legislative 
action at the state level. For instance, if cable television 
could be classified as a public utility, regional construction and 
operation of all or part of a system could be pursued under authority 
granted in Va. Code§§ 15.1-304 through 15.1-307. 
Elsewhere in Northern Virginia, the town of Leesburg granted 
a franchise to Storer Corrmunications in August, 1980, after a 
process which involved an arrangement with the 1.Dudoun Time-Mirror 
that could result in a virtual ITKJD.opoly of local news on cable.23 
Storer did not consider Leesburg especially promising in profit 
terms, but instead saw it as a stepping stone to other franchises. 
The fact that a corrm.mity of approximately ten thousand people, 
with two to three thousand households, could be expected to 
generate gross revenues of seven hundred, fifty thousand dollars 
per year says a great deal about the relative importance of system 
size for feasibility.24 This "stepping stone" issue also raises 
significant networking questions in considering any future fran-
chising action by 1.Dudoun County. 
22washington Post, 8 August 1980, sec. c, p. l; and Interview, 
Emrich and Flynn. 
23washington Post, 27 August 1980, sec. c, p. 1. 
24washington Post, 28 August 1980, sec. B, pp. 1, 10. 
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Elsewhere in Northeni Virginia, the City of Falls Church 
has begun consideration of a•franchise, but to this point has only 
adopted ethical and other guidelines for the conduct of that 
process.25 Prince William County has given sane initial considera-
tion to cable television, but the Board of Supervisors has decided 
to defer action.26 
The Riclm:md Area Experience 
The City of Riclm:md, in 1972, made its initial effort in 
the cable field by advertising for bids. Of seven subrrj_tted, four 
proposed some form of local input. The City Manager's recorrrnenda-
tion, however, was in favor of a company making no such offer. 
Controversy over this issue ensued, and this, with confusion 
engendered by changing Federal COIIIllllilications Corrmission regulations, 
led Council to abandon the effort. Also involved in this delay 
was conceni that a Voting Rights controversy over the annexation 
of a portion of Chesterfield County might affect any franchise 
granted.27 It is ironic that this indirect impact offers one of 
the few examples found in this entire study of a major effect of 
the lavv upon the Virginia cable franchising process. 
In 1977, a member of City Council, m::>st likely at the 
prompting of early industry lobbying, requested the City Attoniey 
and Administration to draft a second bid package and ordinance. 
25rn.terview, William F. Roeder, Jr. , Falls Church, 14 
November 1980. 
26rnterview, Emrich and Flynn. 
27Tuid. 
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1he stated objective at that t:ime was the three percent revenue to 
be generated for the City, revenue which tmder FCC guidelines was 
designated to cover the cost of "regulation." Despite the fact 
that the Administration felt that the City was incapable, especially 
from a technical standpoint, to proceed 'With a franchise award at 
that point, the new package was prepared. It was based primarily 
on that of Henrico Cow.ty, which had passed a cable television 
ordinance on February 25, 1976, and Virginia Beach.28 A Notice of 
Invitation for Bids was published on September 1, 1977,29 after 
minor changes had been made by the consultant, Warren L. Bratm, 
who had been hired at the suggestion of the "Manager, and by 
Cotmcil. 30 1he issue of local control over the system and access 
to it was addressed only once in the Notice, and this was merely 
to ask whether or not any local control of access would be offered. 
Apparently, this was done "out of an abtmdance of caution," based 
on the local control controversy in 1972.31 1his, and the indirect 
assistance of the Washington consulting firm which drafted the 
Henrico and Virginia Beach papers, was almost the extent of outside 
non-industry participation in the planning phase. Other input was 
apparently limited to minor suggestions by the Ford Fow.dation. 
28rnterview, Daniel W. Allen, Richmond, Virginia, 2 December 
1979. 
29warren L. Bratm, ..::.C.::::,ity;::;.i.--=o-=f:.._Ri:::.::;:.. c=hrmn.::.;..:.::~d..::..: --='C:,:.a:::.b:::.le.;:____;T::,;:e:..::l:..::e.,,;,.vi:::.· s::...:i:::..:on=--=B-=i=ds 
Response Analysis. Harrisonburg, Virginia: Warren L. Braw., Con-
sulting Engineer, 1978. 
30rnterview, Allen. 
3lrbid. 
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After the planning stage, and in fact after the submission of 
bids, Council was also presented with a Report on Cable Television 
in Ricbrn::md prepared by the Citizens' Research Coornittee on 
Cable, which reflected the views of a large number of comrunity 
organizations.32 This report is ID2Iltioned at this point since it 
reflects the major voice for local control, but even so, its 
" ... prirnary concerns lay in the area of access to the system 
by public and non-profit institutions." The issue of overall 
control of the system and its resources was not of prirnary concern. 
The Notice was sent to approximately fifty cable industry 
entities. Any effort to solicit potential local investments was 
apparently limited to the local newspaper advertisement required 
by law of all franchises for the use of public property, easements 
or rights of way, a requirement of little actual relevance of the 
cable process.33 Six nultiple system owners (MSO) submitted bids 
through their local corporations, as follows: Storer Broadcasting 
Company, Cablecom-General, Inc., American Television and Corrm..mi-
cations Corp. , Continental Cablevision, Inc. , Cox Cable Corrmunications, 
Inc., and Century Corrmunication Corp.34 
The Citizens' Corrrnittee analysis of bids was presented to 
the Council and the Manager on March 28, 1978, and its following 
observations are interesting, particularly considering its emphasis 
on access provisions: 
32citizens' Research Corrmittee on Cable. Report on Cable 
Television in Richm::md. Richm:md, Virginia, 28 March 1978, pp. 1-2. 
33rnterview, Allen; and Va. Const., Art. VII, § 9; Va. Code 
§ 15.1-308. 
34Brat.m, City of Richm:md, p. 1. 
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1. None of the applicants made corrmitments concerning 
reduced rates for corrrnunity group or government use of leased 
channels. ATC and Continental did offer to consider the possi-
bility, however; 
2. From the group's viewpoint, the only importance of a 
local board was for citizen participation in local programning. 
It was noted that marketing alone wuld not create an audience for 
such offerings, which of their very nature are of relatively low 
quality, and that only content, volunteer energy, and corrrm.m.ity 
involvement would; 
3. Continental and American offered greater local board 
control of public access channels. Continental proposed that a 
"Corporation for Coll1Ill.fility Access" be fonned by the City for the 
purpose of establishing rules for the public access channel, for 
conducting training programs in its use, and for coordinating its 
use by City agencies and public institutions. The initial board 
membership was to be proposed by the Company, for Council approval; 
4. Corrments on two other proposals are interesting, in 
that even the Citizens' Corrmittee felt that only national industry 
expertise could produce a viable operation. Cablecom, the company 
which eventually filed suit over its loss of the franchise, 
offered a board which was strictly advisory, and selected by the 
company. The Comnittee noted that this was ". . . not likely to 
be the kind of instrument necessary to achieve the full potential 
of commmity prograrrrning. '' At the other extreme, while the Century 
board was to be a:irrk:)st totally independent of company control, the 
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Comnittee objected on the ground that al.rrost no company assistance 
in local programning was likely with this alternative; 
5. Finally, in the strongest suggestion throughout the 
process for corrmunity involvement in the entire cable operation, 
the Comnittee recorrrnended the fonnation of a Cable Television 
Comnission to 
--Oversee compliance with all aspects of the franchise 
ordinance and bid; 
--Evaluate any proposed changes in rates, initiated 
either by the company, the Corrmission, or the public, and 
make recorrrnendations to City Cotmcil; 
--Hear complaints from the public or others concerning 
the system and mediate or report to City Cotmcil; 
. --Insure jgat the system is operated in the public 
interest . . . . 
It was also suggested that the three percent franchise fee be used 
to staff this Comnission. 1136 
The Manager's consultant issued his analysis of the six 
bids on April 10, 1978, and it was notable for the following 
recorrrrendations: 
1. That Council "consider the first principle of applicant 
qualification to be the relative financial strength of each bidder 
... ,"and that the strength of the parent 1'150 and financial 
comnitments·it had made elsewhere be given considerable weight in 
addition to the strength of the local company. Continental, which 
35citizens' Research Comnittee on Cable, ''Report," pp. 3, 
8-11, 28. 
36Ibid. 
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was eventually awarded the franchise, ranked only third in this 
category. ATC, which even~lly received an interest in the award, 
was ranked first with Cox; 
2. That ''local ownership is only as important as the local 
board membership is empowered to act on behalf of the MSO. Most 
of the considerations, such as channel carriage, rules of fairness, 
EEOC, technical and other areas are mder the direct control of 
the F.C.C ..... " Bram specifically left any detennination on 
this matter to Comcil's discretion, and on only this issue and 
that of canpany "character" made no analysis or recorrrrendation. 
Proposed percentages of local ownership, which were minimal and 
varied little, were reported, as follows: 
Century, Cox, Storer and 
Cablecom 
Continental 
ATC 
20% each 
up to 20% 
16 - 19%37 
After intensive lobbying by local citizens with investment 
potential in the various local companies and by representatives of 
the MSO' s, Council awarded the franchise to Continental. This 
came only after American withdrew in favor of Continental, having 
reached an agreement to purchase an interest in the local company.38 
While extensive additional research would be necessary to 
confirm them, several preliminary conclusions can apparently be 
made concerning the RichmJnd procedure . in this case, as follows : 
37Bram, City of RichmJnd, pp. 11-1, X-1, X-1-3. 
38Richrnond Tines-Dispatch, 28 May 1978, sec. B, p. l; 
Interview, Allen; and Interview, Hall. 
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1. 'While IIRl.Ch has been made about "political framework, 11 
the local ownership groups ftom which Cmmcil had to choose all 
represented the corrmunity with relative success. It ma.y be true 
that the economic impact on various prominent local individuals 
did not escape members of Council, but it has not been established 
by substantial evidence to this point that this was a detenninative 
factor;39 
2. Apparently, the chief objectives of all parties involved 
in the process were limited to additional City revenue, local 
control of public access channels, the technological sophistication 
of services to be offered under the franchise, and the financial 
ability of the franchisee to perfonn according to its proposal; 
3. Rather than establishing its own priorities and objectives 
through planning prior to an invitation for bids, on the issue of 
ownership or any other, Council for the rrost part reacted to the 
input of industry lobbyirig, the "Manager's and Consultant's recom-
mendations of a technical and financial nature, and perhaps some 
limited corrrm.mi.ty pressure for involvement in control of local 
access. This is particularly relevant in light of the City 
Administration's position that even on technical subjects, the 
City was tn1prepared in 1977 to reinitiate the franchise process. 
This, and Council's willingness to participate in ex parte dis-
cussions and executive sessions,40 at best should have been 
39Richrrnnd Times-Dispatch, 28 May 1978, sec. B, p. 1. 
4~chmond TiTIEs-Dispatch, 28 May 1978, sec. B, p. l; 
Richrrond Times-Dispatch, 16 May 1978, sec. B, p. 1. 
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expected to cause public confusion concerning their objectives 
and the extent to which the award met them, and at worst to 
raise questions of due process which, while not necessarily of 
legal significance, could bring into public question the essential 
fairness of the process and its conformity with the public 
interest; 
4. Such confusion concerning the actual public objectives 
of the process is evident in the filing of Cablecom-General of 
Virginia, Inc. v. City of Richmond, et al. While a complex case, 
and one which may have turned rrore on legal procedural questions 
than questions of fact, the central issues were whether Council 
had complied with Virginia law by awarding the franchise to 
the ''highest and best bidder," an issue of ownership; and that 
of due process and ex parte corrm.mications. As might have 
been expected, the Court refused to overturn Council's exercise 
of its discretion in the absence of evidence of arbitrary and 
capricious action. Actually, it is difficult to conjecture how 
such evidence could have been produced, since Council's criteria 
for judgrrent were less than evident. The plaintiffs based their 
contention primarily on the reccirm2ndations of the City con-
sultant. 41 If, however, one assumes that the primary objective 
of Council was control of local access, then its choice of 
Continental seems not at all unreasonable. When this is coupled 
with the participation of financially strong Anerican in the 
local company, thereby meeting one of the Consultant's major 
objections to Continental, the award is even rrore logical. 
4lcablecom v. H.iclmmd, No. 790387 (Richrrond Circuit 
Court, Div. II, Decenber 11, 1978). 
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Had Virginia law required, as the literature suggests, 
that the Council publish its, reasons for decisions on franchise 
issues,42 an opportunity would have been available at least for 
the production of evidence. Perhaps the controversy could even 
have been avoided. 'That ass1..1I11es, of course, a willingness for 
candor in such situations. 
Chesterfield County becam= involved in cable television 
franchising primarily because it would have been politically 
untenable not to do so, since RicbmJnd and Henrico citizens were 
to have soon the service available. The County administrator 
was of the opinion that the County had insufficient population 
density to support a system and that if any MSO could provide 
service, it would be Continental, which had received the other 
area franchises. Both analyses proved to be incorrect. Despite 
the latter, and despite the cultural diversity of the County, 
between its northern suburbs and southern and western rural 
corrmunities, no regional neb\Qrking approach was ever considered. 
Actually, the fact that Continental had franchises in adjoining 
jurisdictions probably was detrimental to its bid. It ITDJSt be 
rerneniliered in this regard that interjurisdictional dispute 
between Chesterfield and Richm:Jnd played a significant role in 
the demise of an earlier attempt to establish cable in RicbmJnd, 
as well as the prevalent opinion in Chesterfield government that 
any cooperative effort with the two adjoining larger jurisdictions 
42walter S. Baer, 
Decisiornnaking (New York: 
Cable Television: A Handbook for 
Crane, Russak & Co., 1974), p. 82. 
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results in a lower level of service for Chesterfield citizens. 
MOre specifically, however, pointing to the importance of both 
careful planning and interjurisdictional cooperative effort, it 
was essentially too late for Chesterfield to be a part of such a 
network; Richm::md and Henrico had already acted and planned 
their systems. Also, in another rare instance of the law 
indirectly affecting the cable franchising process, Richm:md was 
once again in litigation (Cablecorn), which would discourage 
interjurisdictional negotiations for changing the status quo. 
Also, cooperation was unlikely before the issue of annexation 
irrrnunity for certain urban counties, including Chesterfield and 
Henrico, was settled by the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the 
General Assembly. On a rrore lTD..lildane level, the county admini-
stration also realized that there vvould be very little economy 
of scale even if Continental obtained all three franchises. 
The Chesterfield process was indirectly an excellent 
example of the potential usefulness of standarized procedure. 
The ordinance was developed by the County Attorney, but was 
essentially a synthesis of the Richm::md and Henrico ordinances; 
and the bid application was almost identical to that used by 
Henrico. It was felt that there were few technical problems 
with this, since the Henrico application had been so recently 
developed. The primary distinction of the Chesterfield ordi-
nance was that it attempted to avoid excessive regulatory 
reporting, without diminishing the County's regulatory role. 
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One of its primary objectives was flexibility, both by the 
inclusion of an overly vague provision for maintenance of $tate-
of-the-art service, and by requirements of a contract and per-
fonnance bond. 
The only consultant hired by the county was Telecom of 
Kansas City, Missouri, which was only to evaluate bids received; 
but the Board of Supervisors did adopt, and follow, strict 
guidelines for the award process, which avoided the type of ex 
parte contact problem which helped lead to the RicJ:m::md liti-
gation and which is prevalent in the cable industry's relation-
ship to government, including the FCC. Specifically, late 
submissions were prohibited, unlike in Alexandria.43 
Following the analysis of bids, the County Administration 
was inclined to recorrrnend acceptance of that of Continental. 
This was not primarily because of any substantial differences as 
to service, but instead largely because Continental, on the 
advice of its attorney, State Senator Frederick T. Gray, had 
avoided the practice, so typical in such procedures, of bringing 
local pressure to bear on the governing body.44 Storer had not 
hesitated to take the "rent-a-citizen" route, using local owner-
ship by prominent citizens. The County Administration feared 
that similar pressure could be used in thwarting regulatory 
efforts. In a decision which is excellent evidence of the primary 
importance of the political factor in detennining the outcome of 
43rn.tervi~, Micas. 
44rbid.; and Intervi~. Hall. 
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cable franchising processes, Storer received the franchise on a 
vote of three to two. 
A small area of the County has recently gone into service. 
Storer apparently is well financed and has evidenced a willing-
ness to make significant front-end capital expenditures. The 
principle problem so far has involved only minor slippage in 
meeting installation deadlines. No evidence of use of the 
political clout of local owners to weaken regulatory efforts has 
been encountered. The consumer response to the system is in-
dicated by a relatively high penetration rate and an average 
bill of approximately thirty dollars per nonth, as compared to 
the basic service charge of six dollars and ninety-five cents.45 
The Tricities Experience 
In the Tricities Area, two antiquated twelve channel 
systems in three jurisdictions, originally designed for reception 
improvement and m:in:i.rnal additional service, were granted new 
franchises with only those changed provisions absolutely re-
quired to be made by March 31, 1977, by the FCC' s Cable Television 
Report and Order, 37 F. R. 3252 (1972). The changes were made on 
the initiative of the companies involved, in the same marm.er as 
earlier franchises had been granted in Petersburg and Colonial 
Heights. It is ironic that this was done at the same tilre as 
Arlington's "prototype for cable television nationally" was 
being qeveloped. 
45rnterview, Micas. 
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The Colonial Heights and Petersburg franchises do operate 
as a unified system. No ser}-ous consideration has ever been 
given, however, to joint operation of this system with that in 
Hopewell on a regional basis, which could rreke a wider range of 
prograrrrning and access services IIDre feasible.46 Nor has any 
plan been advanced for dividing such a regional system into 
subdistricts which could be IIDre responsive to the diverse 
dem:::>graphic characteristics of the area. 
Several observations of relevance to this paper can be 
made about the cable franchising experience in all three areas. 
As to the historical setting, cable operations in Virginia can 
be divided into two basic categories, those being the limited 
capacity reception improvement systems, and the high capacity, 
multi-service systems. The former category contains, by far, 
the majority, but since 1977 the trend has been toward the 
latter. Prior to that date, the less sophisticated operation 
was the rule, with the exception of a small number of systems in 
some of the larger cities and in one planned corrmunity. 
Secondly, the franchising processes exhibited several 
prevalent characteristics, as follows: 
1. industry initiation of the process and of system 
specifications; 
46rnterview, Michael R. Packer, Petersburg, Virginia, 
12 Noverrber 1980; Interview, Carl R. Pigeon, Hopewell, Virginia, 
12 November 1980; and Petersburg, Virginia, "Sarrrnons Comruni-
cations, Inc. , Franchise Ordinance," 1977. 
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2. issuance of a franchise in any one jurisdiction in a 
region having an impact on all other jurisdictions in the region; 
3. interjurisdictional rivalries, resulting in failure 
to consider regional networking possibilities even when raised; 
4. frequent subordination of the public interest, in 
such issues as ownership options, to the political influence of 
potential local owners; 
5. the need for strictly adhered to franchising due 
process standards, and for demanding standards for citizen 
input; 
6. the high priority given to franchising as a source of 
local govennnental revenue, with such revenue to be used for 
general purposes rather than regulation or public system develop-
ment; 
7. the minimal grant of authority to localities by the 
state, and alrrost no evidence of necessary guidance as to stan-
dardized procedure or review of technical and financial factors; 
8. confusion over the proper extent of local regulation, 
for instance as to rates, and lack of sufficient local expertise, 
even in the m:::>st sophisticated jurisdictions; 
9. the importance of the goal of flexibility in authority 
to meet the demands of technological developrrents during the 
franchise period; 
10. the relative unimportance of population density or 
system size, when compared to dermgraphics, in the analysis of 
system feasibility; and 
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11. the deficiencies of the estalished Virginia franchising 
process as applied to the li~etls:ing and regulation of a new 
technology. 
CHAPI'ER 2 
LOCAL AUillORI'IY IN CABLE FRANCHISING IN VIRGINIA 
Central to the question of effective local governmental 
action in Virginia in the cable television franchising process, 
in addition to the consideration of available resources and 
expertise raised above, is the legal authority required to make 
use of any such resources and expertise; and this raises the 
question of the role that Virginia law and its underlying poli-
tical foundations allow for local government. 
As is often the case, the lack of clear legislative 
mandate has created a confusing situation ripe for litigation. 
Dillon's Rule may aggravate this by engendering questions as to 
the validity of much local action. 
There can be no question that Virginia long has 
followed, and still adheres to, the Dillon Rule of strict 
construction concerning the powers of local governing 
bodies.47 
In judging the extent to which adequate statutory direction has 
been given to Virginia local governments, it must be remembered 
that they are "creatures of the State which are entirely sub-
ordinate to it" and that they can exercise no greater powers 
471973 Rep. Att'y Gen. 37; Cormonwealth v. Arlington 
Count~ Board, 217 Va. 558, 573, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977); and Howard 
Gan, An Introduction to Cable: Som= Basic Technical Infonnation 
and a Look at the Regulatory and Legal Fram=work," Charlottesville, 
Virginia, 18 August 1980. 
28 
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than those conferred upon them.48 The surrrnarized statement of 
the often cited rule, is to the effect that Virginia local 
governments possess only those powers granted expressly, or 
''necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental to the powers 
granted expressly, or those powers "essential to the declared 
objects and purposes" of the local government, which is to say 
not only convenient, but indispensible.49 While the rule has 
been interpreted in some jurisdictions to allow inference of 
powers "reasonably necessary to effectuate a power expressly 
granted," as opposed to those absolutely necessary, it is 
probably nost accurate, and nost realistic for the task here, to 
state the Virginia rule as holding that "[a]ny fair, reasonable 
doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the 
courts against the corporation and the power is denied. 1150 The 
rule has in nost instances in Virginia been strictly construed. 
This has even been the case in its application to grants of the 
police power, and has especially been true in the interpretation 
of county authority.51. It is true that in a related situation, 
.481978 Rep. Att'y Gen. 37; 207 Va. 827, 15 S.E.2d 270 (1967); 
1979 Rep. Att'y Gen. 240; Board of Supervisors of Fairfax Coun v. 
Horne, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 53 1975 ; and 13 Michie s Juris-
prudence Municipal Corporations §§ 26-16 (1974). 
49city of Richrrond v. Board of Supervisors of Henrico County, 
199 Va. 679, 684 (958); 1976 Rep. Att'y Gen. 64. 
50connelly v. Clark CounJY, 307 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ill. App. 
1973); City of Richmnd v. Boar of S~ervisors of Henrico County, 
199 Va. 679, 684 (1958); 1976 Rep.Atty Gen. 64. 
51A. E. Dick Howard, CoI11Ilentaries on the Constitution of 
Virginia (Charlottesville, Va. : University Press of Virginia, 
1974), p. 810. 
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concerning the authority of localities to set rates for telephone 
service, the Virginia Supr~ Court has held that the legislature 
can "abandon" authority to localities by "clear intendrnent" 
without the use of express words. In light of precedent, however, 
it is probably wise for local governments to follow the prest.nIIp-
tion against doubtful authority, since, as the Court noted, 
" ... the difference, if any, between 'power expressly con-
£erred' and 'power conferred clearly and by express intendment' 
is so shadowy as to be indistinquishable. 1152 It should be noted 
in passing that local governments have the express authority to 
regulate cable rates in Virginia. 53 
In accurately assessing that cable television franchising 
and regulatory authority, however, three factors must be con-
sidered. The first, and rrost apparent, is that Dillon's Rule 
itself stands in Virginia not only through judicial precedent, 
but through legislative mwillingness to abrogate it. The 
Comnission on Constitutional Revision proposal in 1971 to 
abandon the rule, to treat county and city authority rrore uni-
fonnly, and to establish home rule in the amendment of charters 
by the local electorate, all in a new Section 3 of Article VII 
of the Virginia Constitution dealing with the authority of the 
General Assembly to provide for the powers of local governments, 
was not approved by the legislature. Those proposals, in fact, 
52City of Ricbrmnd v. Chesa1eake and Potomac Telephone Co. 
of Va., 127 Va. 612, 105 S.E. 127 195 ). 
53va. Code § 15.1-23.1. 
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met with IIDre legislative opposition than any other. This could 
simply have been indicative pf the traditional reluctance to 
take ''too tmsettling a departure from known patterns, '' or to 
open the door to too many uncertain effects. It rrost likely 
also indicates though a detennination on the part of the legis-
lature to maintain strict control over local governments, since 
one of the rationales expressed in debate for maintenance of the 
Dillon Rule was that any excessively narrow judicial inter-
pretation of local authority could be reversed by the General 
Assembly by special act.54 Such cohesive control of local level 
initiative has not only legal, but traditional political under-
pinnings as well. The unified control of local activities by 
the Byrd organization was for many years a distinctive charac-
teristic of Virginia politics. Such aspects of the organization 
as the State Compensation Board, which plays a major role in the 
determination of local governmental salaries; and the selection 
by the legislature of Circuit Court judges, who at one time 
exercised significant political and governmental influence 
through their appointive powers, were designed specifically for 
the maintenance of such control. That authority was not only 
held, but exercised as well, as in the absolute stiffling by the 
organization through state government of any local initiative 
in opposition to massive resistance or in favor of liquor-by-
the-drink. 55 One corrrnentator has gone so far as to say that 
541975 Rep. Att'y Gen. 132; and Howard, pp. 791, 811, 822. 
55J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, ~ B¥od and the Changing 
Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-196~rottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1968), pp. 31-33, 35, 132-1333, 193, 222-223. 
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[t]he history of the Byrd organization denonstrated the 
hypocrisy and sterility of the strict states' rights 
ethic. The machine's states' rights views conflicted 
with other conservative conrnandrrents. Under such 
practices and policies as the State Compensation Board, 
the circuit judge, massive resistance, and state bottle-
only liquor laws, local powers and initiative were 
severely llll.dennined.56 
It cannot be expected that any such strict state control, long 
held and long exercised, would be quickly relinquished, or 
reversed by a conservative judicial system. This also points 
out, however, that the option of doing so does exist, if the 
public interest demands it. 
A second consideration is that Virginia local governments 
do have Constitutional franchising authority which, while it may 
limit some of the flexibility necessary to an effective cable 
process , has been interpreted in many situations in favor of the 
localities. The Virginia Constitution, and statutory provisions 
pursuant to it, not only authorize, but specifically impose a 
procedure by which rights to use public property or easenE11ts in 
cities and towns are to be granted.57 
The authority to grant pennission to use public streets 
has been held in Virginia to infer the authority to attach 
conditions to that grant, despite the implications of the Dillon 
Rule.58 Also, once a franchise is granted, its interpretation 
56Ibid., pp. 347-348. 
57va. Const., Art. VII, § 9; Va. Code§§ 15.1-307 to 316. 
58southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Richrrond, 98 F. 
671; aff'd. 103 F. 31, 44 C.C.A. 147; appeal dismissed 22 S.Ct. 934, 
46 L.Ed. 1264 (1900). 
33 
is frequently in favor of the locality. II . . [A]n ambiguous 
or doubtful contract between. a . . . company and a rrn.micipal 
corporation as to the rights of the public, will be construed in 
favor of the public rights."59 In a field as rapidly changing 
as broadband cormn.mications, it is forttmate that no franchise 
holder can expand upon its rights tm.der a franchise by inference 
from equivocal or doubtful provisions. 60 Interestingly, this 
results from a legal presumption that the tenns of the franchise 
were written by the franchisee. 61 All too often in the past 
this has been the case. Also, it could be useful in some cable 
situations, especially several years into an excessively inflexible 
franchise, that even "exclusive" franchises cannot be held to 
bar the further exercise of the franchise authority. 62 · Finally, 
Virginia c0tm.ties, cities and towns have been given the authority 
to regulate cable television by express grant, as follows: 
§ 15.1-23.l; Licensing, etc., and regulation of 
cormJLIIli.ty antenna television systems.-- ... 
The governing body of any cotm.ty, city or town may 
license, franchise or issue certificates of public con-
venience and necessity to one or nnre cormrunity antenna 
59city of Richrrond v. C & P Telephone Co. of Va., 127 Va. 
612, 105 S.E. 127 (1958). 
60Atlantic Greyhotm.d Corp. v. Corrm:mwealth, 196 Va. 183, 
83 S.E.2d 379 (1954). 
61Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Co. v. 
Richm:m.d, Fredericksburg & Potomac and Richmond & Petersburg 
Railroad Connection Co., 145 Va. 266, 133 S.E. 888 (1926); City 
of Richrrond v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Va., 205 
Va. 919, 140 S.E.2d 683 (1965). 
62snidow v. Board of Supervisors of Giles County, 123 
Va. 919, i4o S.E.2d 683 (1965). 
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television systems, and impose a tax thereon; may regu-
late such systems, including the establishment of fees 
and rates, and assigJ'lREnts of channels for public use and 
operate such channels assigned for public use, or provide 
for such regulation and operation by such agents as the 
governing body may direct. In exercising the powers 
granted in this section, the governing body shall confonn 
to rninirrun standards with respect to the licensing, 
franchising or the granting of certificates of con-
venience and necessity for corrmunity antenna television 
systems and to the use of channels set aside for general 
and educational use which shall be adopted by the Vir-
ginia Public Telecorrmunications Board; such minimum 
standards being for the purpose of assuring the capability 
of developing a statewide general educational telecorn-
rrn.mications network or networks; provided, however, 
that the owner or operator of any corrmunity antenna tele-
vision system shall not be required to pay the cost of 
interconnecting such corrmunity anterm.a television systems 
between political subdivisions. 
Also, Va. Code § 2.1-563.10.14 establishes as one of the seventeen 
duties of the Virginia Public Telecorrmunications Board that of 
ensuring" ... the provision of assistance to the political 
subdivisions of the Conrnonwealth in matters relating to cable 
television and other public telecormn.mications facilities, 
services and entities .... " This remains, apparently, one of 
the Board's lowest priorities. For future reference, three 
points should be noted: 
1. The authority granted is pennissive, not mandatory; 
2. Only minimal state standards, or assistance in 
limited situations, are provided for; and 
3. Substantial limitation is placed upon the authority 
to require intercorm.ection between systems in different juris-
dictions. 
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In light of the unwillingness evidenced by these statutes 
to interject the state into the cable regulation arena to any 
significant degree, it is appropriate to address briefly the 
question of division of authority between the state and localities. 
The State Corporation Comnission is charged with the duty 
of "regulating the rates, charges, services, and facilities of 
all public service companies" in Virginia. 63 Given the general 
definition of the tenn "public utility," and the nature of the 
cable television industry and particularly its use of public 
rights-of-way, allowed by local goverrnnents for the provision of 
public service, it would be difficult to propose that cable 
television should not come within such regulation. McQuillin, 
for instance, defines a public utility in tenns which describe 
state-of-the-art cable television services fairly well: 
[I]n order to constitute a public utility, the 
business or enterprise must be impressed with a public 
interest, and those engaged therein must hold themselves 
out as serving or ready to serve all rnernbers of the 
public to the extent of their capacity, and the nature of 
the service must be such that all members of the public 
have an enforceable right to demand it .... 64 
Just such requirements are typical of franchise ordinances, and 
use of public property would probably be tmjustifiable if they 
were not. 
In detennining whether or not sec regulation would be 
appropriate, however, one must also consider the related issues 
of whether or not cable television constitutes, as utilities 
267. 
63va. Code § 12.1-12; Va. Const., Art. IV, § 2. 
6~cQuillin, § 34.08; citing Dispatch v. Erie, 249 F. Supp. 
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typically regulated by the SCC do, a COIIIIlJil carrier or an 
industry necessarily involvipg a natural m:mopoly. That the 
corrm:m carrier status of the industry has been a major issue for 
some time is undeniable. Its current status, however, in that 
regard is tenuous, despite the fact that it practically can be 
so operated and despite the public policy benefits from such 
operation that have been noted. In a landm:rrk case for the 
industry, the Supreme Court in 1979 struck down Federal Corrmuni-
cation Corrrnission public access regulations, which the Corrmission 
had claimed authority to impose as reasonably ancillary to 
achieving its legitimate objectives in the regulation of tele-
vision broadcasting. 'The Court stated that 
With its access rules, ... the Corrrnission has 
transferred control of the content of access cable channels 
from cable operators to members of the public who wish to 
corrmunicate by the cable medium. Effectively, the Com-
mission has relegated cable systems, pro tanto, to 
corrnvn-carrier status. A corrnnn carrier service in the 
corrmunications context is one that 'makes a public offering 
to provide [ corrm.mications facilities] whereby all members 
of the public who choose to employ such facilities may 
corrmunicate or transmit intelligence of their own design 
d h . 65 an C OOSJ.ng • • • • 
It was also held that this was violative of § 3 (h) of the 
Corrmunications Act of 1934, to the effect that "a person engaged 
in . . . broadcasting shall not . . . be deemed a corrnnn carrier. '' 
It specifically was held that this not only precluded a presl1mption 
by the Corrrnission that a broadcaster was a corrnnn carrier, an 
65Federal Corrmunications Corrmission v. Midwest Video Corp. , 
et al., 440 U.S. 689, 700-703; 99 S.Ct. 1435, 1441-1443; 59 L.Ed.2d 
692, 702-704 (1979); and 47 U.S.C. § 153 (h). 
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interpretation which the language of the Act might reasonably 
allow, but also evidenced a Congressional intent to protect 
journalistic freedom by proscribing corrnnn carrier treat:rrent in 
any event, even in the case of the cable television industry 
with its utility-like technology. The Court specifically 
declined to rule on potential Constitutional challenges which 
might arise from other access requirements which would allow 
greater editorial discretion, as in the case of the fairness 
doctrine.66 What effect the various proposals for amendment of 
the Comnunications Act in the nature of deregulation would have 
on the current local practice in Virginia of requiring some 
public access is, of course, open to question. 
Utility status would require, as has been seen, a public 
purpose or a purpose at least involved with the public interest, 
just as would also be the case in any effort at local public 
ownership. In the case of such ownership, or even considering 
only franchise fee revenue, the TIEre fact that the public sector 
profits financially in a proprietary manner from an enterprise 
is not sufficient to grant public purpose status, although the 
use of such profits to subsidize public purpose broadcasting 
might mitigate this limitation.67 The fact that the service can 
only be provided by the use of easements .• in some cases gained 
by eminent domain, and that the service in oost cases, ignoring 
66Tuid. 
67Jarnes W. Perldns, Tax-Exerrpt Financing of Carrmmity-
Controlled Cable Television Facilities (Cambridge, Mass.: Center 
for Economic DevelopTIEnt, 1976), pp. 6-7. 
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some of the recent developments in individual satellite reception, 
cannot be obtained by individuals alone except at very high 
cost, could in the first case be utility status by the facility's 
own bootstraps, or in the latter could be mitigated by its 
possible luxury characterization. The public purpose involved, 
however, does not consist simply of the use of public easements, 
as has been seen. The potential future use of broadband comm.mi-
cations as a major social and cultural resource rrust also be 
considered. Ironically this could be established IIDre clearly, 
given enhanced state or local goverrnnental regulation, for 
reasons analogous to the Federal tax exemption situation.68 If 
local governments were to aggressively address the social and 
political nature of the medium and the use of its prof its, as 
opposed to the more corrmercially oriented objectives of the FCC, 
the public purpose question would be clearer. Utility status is 
also tmclear due to the continuing contention of many that, due 
primarily to competition from other media, cable remains a 
luxury instead.69 
The natural monopoly question is similarly unresolved. 
Because of the expenses involved in the duplication of trunkline, 
if nothing else, competition between companies is unlikely.70 
68Tuid.' p. 9. 
69Brenda Fox, "An Introduction to Cable: Some Basic 
Technical Infonnation and a I.Dok at the Regulatory and Legal 
Framework,'' Charlottesville, Virginia, 18 August 1980. 
70Roger G. Noll, et al., Economic As ects of Television 
Regulation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973 , p. 195. 
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There are a number of situations in which this might not be the 
case, however, as where the .demand for channels is high, 71 or 
where an older system has becorre antiquated. 72 The rronopoly 
question is also tmcertain because of the fact that, while the 
plant may be a natural monopoly, prograrrrning rarely is; and to 
separately regulate or operate the two can cause problems, as in 
detennining rate base allocations in rate regulation. 73 Legally, 
however, all of the Virginia ordinances examined were specifi-
cally nonexclusive, and there is substantial question whether 
any other alternative would be available tmder Virginia lBJ.N. 74 
The question of rronopoly is clouded on rrore practical 
legal grotmds, however, by the fact that even where competition 
might economically be possible, its use as a tool by local 
government is limited, if for no other reason than by the threat 
of vexatious litigation. Admittedly, the situations in which 
competition would be feasible are few, since in n:nst cases price 
cutting to achieve even a slightly lower cost per subscriber 
through increased penetration would likely result in an tmstable 
system leading to only one operator. This, of course, would not 
be the case if any system had reached capacity without satisfying 
71Ibid., citing Richard A. Posner, "Cable Television: The 
Problem of local Mmopoly," RM-6309-FF (Santa Mmica: Rand Corp., 
1970). 
72Interviev, Micas. 
73B. R. Allenby, "Deregulation Proposals and the Cable 
Television Industry" (M.A. thesis, University of Virginia, 1974). 
pp. 86-87. 
74Interview, Emrich and Flynn; Interview, Jacks and Evans; 
and Interview, Golden. 
40 
demand, 75 as in the situation of older systems with few channels 
and services technologically. incapable of expansion. Even so, 
the local goverrnnental willingness to use competition through 
issuance of a second franchise IDuld be diminished by the alm::>st 
certain prospect of suit by the original grantee, whether well 
founded or not, if on no other grounds than contract. Negotiation 
for improverrents, with use of competition as an implied threat, 
is probably as much as the locality can hope to obtain. 76 No 
better example of the practical limitations of cable franchises, 
and the concomitant need for careful planning for future flexi-
bility, exists. 
In any event, the Commnwealth of Virginia has chosen to 
limit its involverrent in the process to that enunciated in § 
15.1-23.1, and this substantially leaves out any role of the 
sec, which regulates the activities of the following public 
service companies as provided by the Constitution and expanded 
by statute: railroads, telephone, gas, electric light, heat; 
power, and water supply, pipeline, sewers, telegraph; and corrmm 
carrier transportation companies.77 The decision has also been 
made by enactment of § 15.1-23.1 that cable television is an 
enterprise which, while not an essential utility in the strict 
75Robert E. Babe, Cable Television and Telecorrrnunications 
in Canada: kl Economic hlalysis (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan 
State University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Division of Research), 1975), pp. 56-57. 
76can, "Introduction to Cable"; and Interview, Tyman. 
77va. Const., Art. IX, § 2. 
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sense, requires regulation beyond that involved with controlling 
the use of public property. Otherwise, franchising authority 
would not have been given to cmmties, in nost of which the 
public roads are controlled by the State, and none of which have 
constitutional franchising authority.78 
To point out the deficiencies of state initiative is not 
to say either that they are without cause or that localities 
should not be left with significant discretion. Perhaps the 
reason that government at both the state and local level in 
Virginia refuses to take a nore aggressive approach is related 
to the readiness of private enterprise to treat the rredium as a 
corrmercial enterprise, and the resulting reluctance of a con-
servative judicial system to find a public purpose for regulation 
or ownership, which one might expect to find under such circum-
stances. 79 Also, experience indicates that state utility 
cOIIIDission regulation can lead to increased delay, confusion, 
and costs of reporting and carnpliance, to be passed on to the 
subscriber.SO Be that as it may, there is justification, beyond 
just the regulation of the use of public streets, for signifi-
cant local control. 
Zoning, for instance, is a function jealously guarded by 
local goverrments in Virginia, and for technological reasons, 
site selection for cable facilities is intricately involved with 
78Howard, pp. 857-858. 
79Perkins, p. 7. 
80Allenby, p. 70. 
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the land use question. Frequently there are as few as three or 
four sites available iii even a large cOIIITIUnity for the headend 
site, primarily for reasons of interference from existing or 
future land uses, and the role of local goverrnnent in both 
selecting and protecting such sites is important. This is 
especially true of systems using midband and superband frequencies, 
since they are shared with military, police, business, weather 
radio, aircraft, navigation, and citizen band uses. Two way 
systems using frequencies below 30 MEiz for upstream signals are 
also especially susceptible to interference from very high 
powered transmitters. This can create particular problems in 
converting one way systems, so it is apparent that any locality 
anticipating even the possibility of such a conversion IIR.ISt 
plan, and not only in its cable activities, from the beginning 
to make this as feasible as possible. Site selection by the 
franchisee and the locality can involve computer prograrrming, 
aerial surveys, ground based measurerrents, and a review of both 
system and extrasystem signal strength and azim.lth bearings. It 
must attempt to anticipate both private and public sector improve-
ments, such as water tanks, which might appear at first to be 
unrelated, but which could constitute interference in the electro-
magnetic spectrum; as well as the availability of services to 
the system itself, such as an emergency power source in large 
corrmunities not susceptible to total power blackout.Bl It would 
be difficult to overestimate the importance of this process, or 
Blcunningham, pp. 122-123, 172, 197, 326. 
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the cooperation of the localities in the exercise of zoning, 
plarming and police power authority, in m3king adequate service 
" possible, especially in rapidly developing cOITIIllll1ities. 
. . . At the present time the electromagnetic 
spectrt.ml is becoming polluted by spurious signals from 
transmitters and incidental radiation from noncorrm..mi-
cations devices. Undoubtedly, if a catastrophe in 
cOITIIllll1ications is to be avoided, the day will come when 
pollution of the spectrt.ml is considered as serious as 
pollution of the atmosphere. Unfortunately, that day 
hasn't arrived, and until then the system operator m.ist 
do his best to select a site as free as possible from 
interference. He m.ist also keep a watchful eye on 
industrial developm2Ilts in the area that might later lead 
to interference. Sarne types of interference require a 
great deal of imagination to anticipate ... 82 
Perhaps one of the m::>st important reasons for local 
regulation, and one of those issues least effectively addressed 
in the franchising process required of local governments by 
current Virginia law, has to do with adequate standards for 
dealing with citizen-subscriber complaints. Local government is 
uniquely capable of responding to this regulatory need, and it 
is important that objective standards be promulgated in the 
franchise itself for dealing.with potential problems. Otherwise, 
there is no way to judge complaint validity, or seriousness of 
complaints, the public will itself have no objective way of 
judging the effectiveness of the local governmental effective-
ness, and the city could be left open to a charge of favoritism 
to the MS0.83 This is especially true of a situation so sus-
ceptible to the viscissitudes of local political pressure. 
82Ibid., pp. 122-123. 
83Baer, p. 110. 
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Nonetheless, flexibility of local response is just as 
important as the enunciation of perfonnance standards. The 
ultimate sanction of termination or nonrenewal is rarely credible,84 
and for this reason the provision for perfonnance bonds and 
security funds fotmd in some Virginia ordinances, but not in 
some of the older ones, are important.SS In passing, it can be 
noted that an effective local response demands such flexibility 
in the franchise generally, and especially as regards future 
additional regulations as rapidly developing technology radically 
alters the meaning of "state-of-the-art" service. 
Without adequate system specifications from the beginning 
the risk is run of inadequately planned growth causing serious 
technologicai problems which can actually make state-of-the-art 
performance impossible or at best make judgrn=nts concerning 
system perfonnance tmcertain. Prime examples are the addition 
of channels or the conversion from one to two-way service.86 
Many systems installed within the last decade, including those 
in the Tricities and especially those installed pr:inia.rily for 
reception improvement, are for practical purposes limited to 
twelve channels; and with the smaller twelve channel system, it 
is often everi difficult to predict whether additional channels 
are possible.87 
84rbid. 
85e.g., Richrrond Ord. 77-168-157, § l; Contracts §§ 11.D. 
and 12. Such provisions are not f0tmd in any of the Tricities 
ordinances. 
86ctmningham, pp. 195-196. 
87Ctmningham, pp. 212-213; Micas; Cunningham, p. 196. 
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The most effective franchise will be that ordinance which 
establishes only the organic.. framework for operation regulation, 
leaving specifications to a subordinate contract or certificate 
of necessity (which infers a decision by the governing body both 
less apparently exclusive and involving broader connrunity and 
economic considerations than the franchise alternative) subject 
to change as local conditions and technological developments 
require.88 Thus, not only does generality of tenns make con-
struction of the ordinance more likely to be favorable to the 
locality and the public interest,89 but it leaves a greater 
possibility of modification of agreements as changed circum-
stances require, in protecting that interest. Requirements 
concerning future modifications within the franchise term should 
not themselves be overly vague though, as in requiring only that 
the franchisor ''keep up with the state-of-the-art." The fleY.i-
bility this would allow would be rrore than outweighed by the 
extent to which this would leave the planning for such increased 
sophistication to the franchisee, according to its standards, 
and to which the authority of the locality to make specific 
requirements _would be open to question which might lead to 
litigation.90 Even such vague provisions for future modification 
are preferable to none at all, however, as is the case in several 
Virginia jurisdictions. 
88rnterview, Micas ; and Baer, p. 140. 
89Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Comm., 196 Va. 183, 83 S.E.2d 
379 (1954). 
90Baer, pp. 206-207. 
46 
On a related point, it is also unwise to impose technical 
requirements by reference tq, those of the FCC, which have an 
uncertain future. 91 Perfonnance by Virginia localities varies 
considerably on this point, from those provisions such as §§ 
2(5), 4, 16, and 17 of the Colonial Heights ordinance, which 
impose only FCC requirements and anticipate no federal deregu-
lation; to those like §§ 7.B. and 9.H. of the Richm:md ordinance, 
which do anticipate local authority at least on some points in 
the event of deregulation permitting local action; to those 
exemplified by the Fairfax County ordinance in Article 7, §§ 
4(a), 5(a), and 6(a), where the FCC is relied upon, but a con-
current local role is anticipated, as well as the possibility of 
deregulation. 
Im. inspection of several local ordinances evidences a 
wide disparity of perfonnance on the question of technical 
requirements. 
Northern Virginia 
The Arlington County Code, §§ 41-4 (h) and 41-9 (e), 
address this issue specifically, as follows: 
§ 41-4 (h) The company shall undertake any 
construction and installation as may be necessary to keep 
pace with the latest developments in the state of the 
art, whether with respect to increasing channel capacity, 
furnishing improved converters, instituting two way 
services, or otherwise. 
§ 41-9 (e) 
(e) After receiving recorrrnendations from the 
agency and the county staff, giving due regard to techno-
logical limitations, the board may require that any part 
91Gan, "Introduction to Cable." 
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or all of the system should be improved or upgraded 
(including, without limitation, the increasing of channel 
capacity, the furnishjng of improved equipment, and the 
institution of two-way transmission), it nay order such 
improvement or upgrading of the system, to be effected by 
the company within a reasonable time thereafter. 
The Alexandria Code, §§ 7B-44 and 7B-66, offer even IDJre 
specific standards: 
(e) The city council nay require that any part or 
all of the cable television system should be improved or 
upgraded by the franchisee within a reasonable time 
thereafter (including, without limitation, the increasing 
of channel capacity, the furnishing of improved equiprrent, 
and the institution of two-way transmission) ; provided 
such improvement or upgrading of the system is found to 
be economically feasible. For the purpose of this sub-
section, a finding of economic feasibility shall rrean a 
finding that the capital costs to the franchisee of such 
improvement or upgrading can reasonably be arrortized over 
the then remaining life of the franchise. 
§ 7B-66. Functions of administration. . . . The 
administrator's powers and responsibilities shall include, 
but not be limited to, the following functions ... 
(k) To conduct evaluations of the system at least 
every three (3) years, with the franchisee, and pursuant 
thereto, make recornrn211.dations through the city manager to 
the council for arrendrnents to this chapter or to the 
franchise agreement. 
Alexandria Franchise Contract, paragraph 3 
3. This contract shall not relieve ACC from the 
requirements of the applicable ordinances, and it is 
understood and agreed that the City reserves the right to 
impose such additional regulations or ordinances as it my 
[may] deem reasonable with respect to ACC in particular 
or cable television generally. 
The Fairfax County Code, Chapter.9, Article 5, § 3, 
however, contains a provision which would probably be difficult 
to enforce, given its vagueness. 
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Section 3. Franchise review. 
It shall be ths= policy of the Cotmty to amend a 
franchise, upon application to a Grantee, the recorrrre.nda-
tion of a Cable Television Administrator, or upon the 
Board's own motion, when necessary or advisable to enable 
the Grantee to take advantage of advancements in the 
state-of-the-art which will afford it an opporttmity to 
more effectively, efficiently, or economically serve its 
subscribers or the Cotmty; provided, that this section 
shall not be construed to require the Cotmty to make any 
amendment for such purposes. 
Richmond Area 
The Richm:md Ordinance No. 77-168-157 (Contract Paragraph 
16), is similarly vague, and has the added disadvantage of 
relying on FCC regulations which may cease to exist. It also 
apparently leaves the greater initiative for system :improvement 
to the operator. 
B. It shall be the policy of the City to amend 
this Franchise, upon application of the Grantee, when 
necessary to enable the Grantee to take advantage of 
advancements in the state-of-the-art which will afford it 
an opporttmity to more effectively, efficiently, or 
economically serve its Subscribers; provided, however, 
that this section shall not be construed to require the 
City to make any amendment. Further, within the tenn of 
the Franchise, Cotmcil shall hold a public hearing, the 
purpose of which will be to consider System performance, 
System design modifications, and the possible need for 
reasonable and appropriate modifications in the Franchise 
of a nature that would not result in effectively termi-
nating same tmder the then existing Federal Corrm..mications 
Comnission Rules for Cable Television. This Franchise 
may be amended at any time in order to conform with the 
applicable Federal law and FCC rulings after notice and 
public hearing. 
The Henrico Ordinance No. 458 (1976), Article III, § 3, 
is alnnst identical. 
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The Chesterfield Code § 7.1-29, offers a rrodification 
provision which is so extraordinarily vague as to be of questionable 
use; despite the fact that it is not atypical: 
The County hereby expressly reserved the following 
rights: 
(a) To adopt, in addition to the provisions 
contained herein and in the franchise and in any existing 
applicable ordinances, such additional regulations as it 
shall find necessary in the exercise of its police pCJWer 
provided, hO'Wever, that such regulations, by ordinance or 
otherwise, shall be reasonable and not in conflict with 
the rights herein granted. 
(b) To revoke, amend or rrodify the franchise 
granted pursuant to this chapter should the Federal 
Corrrnunications Corrrnission, as a result of its certifi-
cation or registration process, require that substantial 
sections of the chapter, be altered or deleted. 
Ironically, the same Chesterfield Franchise Agreement, § 
6, offers an interesting example of response to inflexible 
system obsolescence, which should constitute a warning: 
§ 6. Purchase of Sarrm:ms Broadcasting System. 
Franchisee agrees to negotiate in good faith to 
purchase from SarrmJns Broadcasting System the cable 
system already in existence in Ettrick serving 340 
customers within Chesterfield Cotmty so as to pennit the 
service of such area in.a manner consistent with the rest 
of the County. The Franchisee shall of fer SarrmJns a fair 
and reasonable price to purchase capital equipment of 
such system and upon purchase of the system shall upgrade 
the system so as to be consistent with the quality avail-
able in the.entire County as soon as practicable. If by 
July 1, 1980 the Franchisee has bargained in good faith 
with SarrmJns and ma.de a fair and reasonable offer for the 
system within the judgment of the Cotmty, but Sarrm:>ns has 
refused to sell such system; the Franchisee shall be 
permitted to extend service to the area already served by 
Samrons consistent with the franchise agreerrent. 
The Sarrnx:ms facilities, operating as part of the Petersburg-
Colonial Heights system in Chesterfield without a franchise, were 
so 
so outdated as to make it of little use to Storer. An offer was 
made, but, as might be expected, was low and was not accepted. 92 
• 
Tricities Area 
The three franchises neither require, by reference or 
otherwise, any technological standards beyond FCC regulations, 
and reserve no right to impose further state-of-the-art require-
rnents. 
There are, however, counterbalancing factors. The best 
franchise ordinance probably would specify technological matters 
to the point of requiring a m::>dular design for the system, 
which, while being initially m::>re expensive and requiring a 
conceptual design of the system and its expansion from the 
beginning, would allow the ordinance to state clear objective 
standards for future development without m:ijor retrofitting or 
obsolence problerns.93 None of the ordinances examined m:ide 
such provision. 
The lack of legislative direction as to the perfonnance 
of local goveTillD2Ilts in cable franchising process creates a 
situation which begs for vexatious litigation, as Cablecorn 
derronstrates. Probably no better example exists than the 
experience in Alexandria. Shortly after two Cmmcil members 
called, apparently with little legal justification, for an 
92Interview, Micas. 
93Baer, pp. 195, 206-207. 
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investigation by the AttoTiley General of the bidding procedures 
used, one bidder called for the renoval of certain Council 
members for threatening to cause difficulties in their future 
city business should that company file suit for any reason.94 
1he number of questions left unanswered by Virginia law is, in 
fact, myriad. For instance, if the public utility status of 
broadband corrrnunications is questionable, there is question as 
to the extent a locality can resort to eminent doma.in to acquire 
easerrents in situations where to do otherwise would ma.ke service 
unfeasible. In the enforcement of a franchise, which is in the 
nature of a contract, to 'What extent can the locality proceed 
first in an action in contract, or is it necessary to go directly 
into a mandamus proceeding, which Va. Code § 15.1-315 would 
appear to allow, even if the remedy in contract was adequate. 
To say this, however, is not to imply that state law is 
devoid of direction, or that it alone is responsible for con-
fusion on the part of local officials as to their proper role. 
On the first point, general franchise law could be considered. 
Even if Federal law should deregulate franchise fees, state law 
would still impose general franchise fee standards.95 The same 
can be said of factors to be taken into account in rate regulation, 
and enforcement guidelines. 96 But just as general franchise law 
94washington Post, 18 July 1979, sec. C, p. 2; and 
Washington Post, 31 July 1979, sec. C, p. 3. 
95c & P Tel,hone Co. of Va. v. City of Newport News, 
627, 85 S.E.2d 345 1955). 
196 Va. 
96cigr of Wheeling v. C & P Telephone Co., 82 W.Va. 208, 95 
S.E. 653 (198); and Appalachian Power Co. v. City of Huntington, 
210 S.E.2d 471 (1974). 
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can answer some questions, it can raise others. For instance, 
one might ask to what extent a cable company operating a two way 
system would be liable for failure to operate properly to a sub-
scriber's detriment, in a way analogous to the liability of a 
telegraph company. Perhaps the legislature should address this, 
and if not, perhaps the local franchising authority should, but 
the proper manner of doing so is less than clear. 
On the second point, Federal law not directly related to 
cable franchising can cause equally difficult questions. Con-
sider, for instance, the recent controversy involving the City 
of Boulder, Colorado, and Corrmunity Corrrrn.mications Company, Inc. 
(CCC),97 concerning primarily the impact of the Sherman .Antitrust 
Act on subdistricting. C.C.C. held a nonexclusive pennit to use 
the rights of way of the City of Boulder for cable television 
facilities and to operate in one part of the city a reception 
improvement system, and the City had detennined that it wished 
to receive bids for one or m:>re state-of-the-art systems to 
cover the entire jurisdiction. In order to maintain the status 
quo, the City restricted C.C.C. from accepting new customers 
during a three m:>nth period during which other potential bidders 
could minimize C. C. C. 's competitive advantage. The company 
challenged the restraint as violative of Federal antitrust law. 
Mtmicipal corporations are no longer deemed to be im:nune 
from· the Sherman Act, after the United States Supreme Court 
97see 485 F.Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1980); 630 F.2d 704 
(10th Girt. 1980); 496 F.Supp. 823 (1980); and Cable Television 
Reports, May 1980, pp. 1-3. 
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decision in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power·and Light Co.98 
Instead, they, l.rrllike sovere,ign states, enjoy such imnunity only 
l.rrlder the following circumstances: 
1. the challenged restraint rrust be one clearly articulated 
and affirmatively exf)ressed as state policy; and 
2. the regulation rrust be actively supervised by the 
state itself. 99 
Also of importance is whether the local government has a proprietary, 
as opposed to governmental, interest in the regulation.100 In 
detennining the specific mandate by the sovereign state, a 
pennissive statute may not be sufficient; a mandatory system of 
regulation may be required,101 which brings into question the 
aroolfilt of actual authority granted by the limited, and permissive, 
§ 15.1-23.1. 'Ill.is is especially true if any Virginia local 
government should take on the proprietary interest of public 
ownership, even ignoring any implications of the Dillon Rule. 
It also raises to a lesser degree, given lack of proprietary 
interest, the question of the authority of Virginia local govern-
ment to deny additional franchises during the tenn of the original 
98u. s·. Sup. Ct. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434, aff 1d., 435 U.S. 389, 98 S.Ct. 1123 
(1978). 
99california Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Mi.deal 
Aluminum, Inc., 100 S.Ct. 937, 943, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980). 
lOOccc v. Boulder, 630 F.2d 704, 708 (1980). 
101Anthony F. Troy, "Exenption from Federal Antitrust Laws 
for Activities of Municipalalities: City of Lafayette and Beyond," 
Fredericksburg, Va., 8 April 1980 (Mim=ographed). 
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grant in those few situations where competition might be 
economically feasible, even j_f such denial was based on the 
perhaps tmjustifiable fear of an action in contract by the 
original franchisee. 
A restraining order was granted by the U.S. District 
Court for Colorado, barring enforcement of the restriction, but 
this was overturned at the Circuit Court level. A pennanent 
restriction of C.C.C. to one area of the City imposed afterwards, 
however, was also.challenged, thereby bringing into serious 
question the authority of local government to set subdistrict 
franchise area botmdaries, and the challenge was sustained by 
the District Court on July 22, 1980. In the second decision, 
the district court held that the degree of regulation required 
to give Boulder antitrust imnunity in such a situation was so 
high as both to constitute an excessive infringement of First 
Amendment rights, and to cause the regulation to be lowered in 
status to a proprietary activity. The Court questioned whether, 
if diversity of prograrrming was the objective, the regulatory 
scheme employed was the least restrictive neans substantially 
capable of achieving it; assuming that diversity of programning 
was even a legitimate local governmental interest. The court 
also noted in analyzing this question, a fear of the control of 
the use of public rights of way to obtain control of program 
content.102 Another issue which was not reached concerned the 
nature of any property right involved with a revocable permit (a. 
question also of importance with franchises in the nature of 
102496 F.Supp. 823, 828-829. 
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contract), which may be revoked without cause, but not for 
illegally anticompetitive calise without a showing of a valid 
governmental purpose; especially when the property right has 
been "enhanced by the First Arnendrrent." Am:mg other such 
questions were claims based on equal protection and inverse 
condemnation principles.103 
Clearly, this case stands as a prime example of the need 
for clear and sophisticated state mandates for local governmental 
regulation of cable television; for realization of the validity 
of the Cable Television Infonnation Center position that threatened 
competition against an operating system is highly likely to have 
a litigious result rarely worth the trouble; for the consequent 
realization that franchises once granted are for practical 
reasons often pennanent; and for the great need for careful 
planning by local authorities, from the beginning of the cable 
experience, for clear and flexible authority to regulate into 
the distant future. 
The need for such standards being apparent, it remains to 
suggest the type of response required of Virginia tp Ireet such 
needs. In several ways, Virginia law hampers effective local 
regulation. Strict application of the Dillon Rule leaves 
authority at the state level, at which it is not used to any 
appreciable degree. Neither the legislature nor the Public 
Telecorrmmications Board has placed high priority on establishing 
103Ibid.' p. 830. 
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general teclmical and financial standards, or tmdel ordinance 
provisions for effective ~ling of such matters as citizen 
complaints or providing for flexible response to tecl:m.ological 
developments. This absence of standards continues despite 
potentially damaging uneven performance on the part of local 
goverrnnents. Additionally, a number of legal questions remain 
unanswered, creating an environment in which the threat of 
vexatious litigation can hamper local initiative. It remains, 
for instance, unclear in which situations the rredium should be 
taken to be a m:mopoly and utility, and when State Corporation 
Corrmission regulation would therefore be appropriate. Also unclear 
is the related question of when the public interest in the rredium, 
beyond the use of public property, is sufficient to justify 
substantial local regulation or public ownership. State policy, 
whether established by statute or otherwise, fails to offer 
clear direction as to what role local goverrnrent is charged with 
perfonning, leaving that role vulnerable to such potential 
pitfalls as antitrust violations. This says nothing, of course, 
of the situations, such as interconnection, in which local 
authority is specifically limited, or the limitations imposed by 
reliance on general franchising authority. With the exception 
of tmre certain options offered, but not extensively used, by 
other types of authority such as zoning, the localities must 
rely· on franchises or resort to certification or licensing. The 
latter process offers rrore flexibility, but as might be expected 
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as a result, less certainty of authority or direction. Generally, 
for these reasons, it must be concluded that the limited and 
questionable nature of local authority to regulate cable tele-
vision in Virginia in the public interest is not conducive to 
effective local initiative. 
CHAPTER.·3 
OWNERSHIP OPTIONS - THE EXPERIENCE IN RICHMJND 
A city must recognize the need for corrmunications 
planning to be able to enter franchise hearings with its 
ov.m. clear requirements rather than rrerely respond to 
company proposals . . . Only when local governments 
charter studies, survey needs, and acquaint themselves 
with CKN sufficiently to allow reasoned decisions about 
what operation best meets both ~diate and long-tenn 
c0Ill1llnity needs will the ad~antages of rrn.micipal owner-
ship be illuminated . . . . 04 
As has already been seen the local control objectives of 
the Richm:md City Cmm.cil and Administration as evidenced during 
its franchise process, especially the planning stage, in granting 
a franchise to Continental Cablevision of Richrrond, Inc. , were 
minimal. The purpose here is two-fold: to delineate the alter-
natives open under current Virginia law or with General Assembly 
action which might reasonably be proposed; and to critically 
compare those objectives with those which the literature and 
general experience raise. To do so will be to point out the 
extent to which the process in Virginia, both an legal and 
political points, substantially fails to address the question of 
the public need. Fairfax County, as a m:i.tter of fact, offers 
the only clear example to the contrary in this study. 
lO~ornas R. Leavens, "Conmunity Antenna Television: The 
Case for Mtmicipal Control," 22 Wayne Law Review 99-136, November 
1975' p. 131. 
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Ownership Alternatives 
Once the goventlng body has set its objectives, the 
observer might look for an examination of at least the following 
ownership alternatives: nn.micipal ownership, public corporation 
or authority, coom:m carrier status, and private ownership, 
either by the industry or local groups; with a number of potential 
policy decisions as to each alternative. 'Ihe record indicates 
that only one alternative, from the last category, was ever 
seriously considered by the Richrrond Council and Administration. 
An outline of the issues which might have been addressed in a 
more extensive plarming phase, and some of the advantages and 
disadvantages inherent in the various alternatives, follows: 
Mlnlicipal or Public Authority Ownership 
Mlnlicipal ownership offers the advantages of increased 
public access opportunities, even if unprofitable or legally 
prohibited under private franchise operations, unilateral 
subsidy of public access, lower subscriber fees than a private 
system could justify, an increase in channel capacity for in-
creased public access when demanded, or facility developIIEilt to 
encourage public access as a public purpose.105 
'Ihere is also less likelihood for censorship or the 
"chilling effect" of the profit rrotive IIEiltioned earlier if the 
system is operated as a public service. Municipal ownership 
could conceivably even engender a constitutional right to access 
not present in the broadcast situation. 
105Ibid.' pp. 116-117. 
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This alternative would require, however, protection 
against abuses of govennrental authority which would diminish 
the effect of decreased censorship. For instance, statutory 
prohibitions against the use of rrn..micipal funds for official 
programnimg, or against use of officials' names or likenesses, 
might be advisable. The potential for enforcement of such 
restrictions would be sorrewhat diminished, since it nost likely 
would be in the hands of local prosecutors, although tradi-
tionally such conflicts have not presented the problem in Virginia 
that they have in some other states. 106 There is also danger in 
the fact that direct rrn..micipal ownership would give access to 
inf onnation which could be collected through the cable system to 
those IIX)St able and likely to use it in a manner violative of 
individual privacy. Private ownership, however, would not 
necessarily solve this potential problem. 
. . . the potential for abuse is not ended by 
private ownership. Private owners m:i.y also be interested 
in collecting infonnation either to use themselves or to 
pass on or sell to others; the operator might assent to 
public or private taps. The real problem is not owner-
ship, but rather CATV' s pervasive potential for invasion 
of privacy and unauthorized use of infonnation.107 
On both of these obstacles to rrn..micipal ownership, the "independent" 
public authority has been recomnended by some as a remedy.108 
Other factors which would affect the operation of a 
IIR.IIlicipally owned system in a unique way, but about the impact 
of which there is considerable question, include 
106rbid., p. 120. 
107Ibid.' pp. 134-135. 
108Ibid. 
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--the economic impact of shopping by cable on both private 
and public investment in shopping centers and downtown areas ; 
--the effect of polling or voting by cable on the political 
system; 
--the impact of availability of data and services by 
cable on the necessity for physical proximity to the central 
city; and 
--the risk of public funds on a technological developm2Ilt 
which potentially could become obsolete. 109 
Beyond direct public funding, two financial advantages of IID.lilicipal 
or authority ownership would be decreased operated expenses 
through ta"'{ exemptions, and the availability of development 
capital through general obligation or revenue bonds.110 
There is considerable question under the Dillon Rule, as 
to whether or not the City of Richmond could have entered into 
such an enterprise without specific authorization by the General 
Assembly, since it would be difficult to make a necessary impli-
cation of ownership from express authority. Such authorization, 
of course, could have meant delay, but delay in the long tenn 
public interest might be a positive choice. Any request for 
authorization to operate a cable system as a proprietery function 
would also have been less than certain, however, since the 
"public purpose" question raised above remains unsettled, and 
since operation of inform:i.tion systems has not been a traditional 
109Ibid., p. 130. 
llOibid., p. 127. 
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function of limited local governm?nt in Virginia. This is, of 
course, especially true of enterprises so easily tied philo-
sophically to the private sector by the potential for substantial 
profit. 
The extent to which this alternative has been considered 
by the Virginia localities examined is questionable. The RichmJnd 
City Manager's Office apparently examined only one such system, 
which eventually went to private ownership. 111 In point of 
fact, as of 1977, there were approximately twenty cities in the 
United States with pUblic owned cable television services.112 
While the Manager's objection that local control or ownership is 
meaningless due to the operational necessity for industry expertise 
is a potential problem, it is not necessarily an insurmJuntable 
one.113 
Connx:m Carrier Status 
In this alternative, the cable system operator would be 
prohibited from any control of prograrrming, but instead would 
lease channels on a non-discriminatory basis. Such an approach 
would have the advantage of encling any justification for govern-
ment control of content based ori. concentration of program control,114 
lllrnterview, Allen, Richrrond, Va., 12 December 1979. 
112Robert E. Jacobson, Mi.Jnici)al Control of Cable Corrmunications 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977 , p. 5; for validity of mmi-
cipal ownership in Frankfort, Kentucky, see Consolidated TV Cable 
Service v. Frankfort, 465 F.2d 1190 (1972). 
113rnterview, Allen; and Leavens, p. 131. 
114Bruce M. Owen, "Cable Television: The FraireWork of 
Regulation." in U.S. Congress, Ser;ate C~ttee on Governmental 
Affairs, Study of Federal Regulation, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Govt. Printing Office, 1978, p. 359. 
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and would generally encourage diversity in the sense envisioned 
by traditional antitrust pripciples. Three recent major studies 
\ 
of cable television [the Cabinet Corrrnittee Report (1974), the 
Corrmittee for Economic Development Report (1975), and the Staff 
Report of the House Subcorrrnittee on Corrmunications · (1976)], have 
recorrmended this alternative to varying degrees.115 
Among objections, primarily from industry, is the possibility 
that comnon carrier status would el:i.m:inate the only potential 
investors willing to develop local prograrrrning while penetration 
of a cable system in a particular market is growing, or that it 
could result in rate-of-return regulation in the manner of 
public utilities, which might be unnecessary for the foreseeable 
future due to competition from other rredia.116 
Private Ownership-Comrnm.ity Organization Ownership 
While the Riclnnond organizational arrangement is of this 
category, there are a number of variations which could have 
been, but apparently were not, seriously considered, as follows: 
1) ownership by "enterprises which have COIIE into being 
within neighborhoods that have special social or ethnic problems 
and constitute in some rreasure sub-cities with special require-
ments and special knowledge of their own;ll7 
2) as implied by the public ownership alternative, 
state-mandated regional franchising authorities, perhaps at the 
SMSA·level, which could grant several franchises in a market, 
ll5Ibid., p. 373. 
116Ibid.' pp. 377, 374. 
ll7s1oan, Television of AblIDdance, p. 162. 
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with boundaries following derrographic standards rather political 
boundaries. This could also. allow for networking to meet sub-
area needs; 118 
3) cross-ownership with local m=dia; this could well 
have required delay of an award until after Federal deregulation, 
since the cross-ownership controversy is one of long-standing in 
the broadcast field, and since cross-ownership of cable systems 
could result in a disproportinate increase in the influence of 
one particular media voice in a cornnunity. It might also be 
profitable for a franchiser under such an arrangement to stifle 
cable growth. It would, however, offer skill and talent resources, 
interest in the local corrrnunity, and a source of start-up capital, 
and could potentially encourage m=dia diversity by enabling 
locally owned newspapers to remain economically viable through 
control of, and profit through, this new medium, which otherwise 
might be threatening. 119 The Leesburg situation ma.y eventually 
to be illustrative of this. 
4) financing, especially if the franchisee is an association 
or joint venture at the local level, gives rise to a number of 
possibilities, such as 
--investment by local banks, church groups, insurance 
companies, savings and loan associations, private investors 
concerned with local development, or industrial concerns; 
118Ibid., pp. 149, 152, 159-160, 162, 177; and Jack Whitley, 
"Cable Television: The Practical Implications of Local Regulation 
and Control," 27 Drake law Review (1977-78): 391-420, 403-404. 
119sloan, Television of Abundance, pp. 137-139. 
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--public investment by corrmunity development programs; 
--"turn-key" constrl!ction of the system by the cable 
industry, with control gradually turned over to a local company 
or venture; 
--mtmicipal construction of the system, with bids being 
taken instead for operating and rnanagerrent.120 
Financing is an especially important consideration in urban 
areas where reception is not an issue, so much as is full service 
from the beginning of the operation.121 
Among the advantages often cited for private cable industry 
ownership are that the availability of local services is econo-
rnically dependent upon the existence of a viable, profitable 
national marketplace. 122 Additionally, an argument for either 
nrunicipal or industry control instead of corrmunity based ventures 
is the fact that corrmunity based systems are seen as economically 
impractical tm.less backed by political and financial entrepreneurs 
tm.reflective of the corrmunity,123 and even this self-defeating 
financial backing might be unlikely considering the lack of 
effective recourse in the event of default.124 
120r..eavens, p. 126; and Tate, pp. 31-32. 
121Leavens, p. 125. 
122Robert W. Hughes, statem=nt before the Subcomnittee on 
Corrmunications, in U.S. Congress, House Comnittee on Interstate and 
Foreign CoIIIIErce, Volurre I, 'Ille Corrmunications Act of 1978, Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1979, p. 485. 
123Jacobson, p. 101. 
124Leavens, p. 125. 
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While the potential cost to the City of Richrrond or the 
delay necessary in obtaining, legislative authorization could 
have been reasons for giving little consideration to encourage-
ment of a corrm..mity venture as franchisee, delay in developing a 
system in which the public interest might have been nore fully 
protected could have been a wiser course. In light of the 
potential social and political implications of a cable system, 
the issue of cost could have been nore fully addressed from the 
standpoint of what one comrentator has called "advocacy economics," 
by inquiring as to the public cost of not developing the system 
as a public or quasi-public one.125 
As have been noted above, the Ricbrnonu v.1..Ly vuuuc.1...L 
created public confusion as to its ownership objectives by 
allowing the agenda of the franchising process to be set solely 
by potential franchisees and an Administration concerned pri-
marily with technical and financial considerations. In fact, 
this may also have evidenced confusion or lack of knowledge on 
the part of Council as to the potential issues to be addressed. 
Ironically, they reached a decision which was justifiable, not 
on the basis of that agenda, but for largely unstated and 
limited concerns over local control. Beyond this, however, 
Council allowed even its consideration of local control to be 
limited to response to industry proposals. As might have been 
expected, those proposals concerned only the control of public 
access, and the granting of relatively m=aningless local ownership. 
125Jacobson, p. 103. 
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The latter proposal was, of course, for the purpose of affecting 
the franchise process by economic windfall for local corrmunity 
leaders more than for increasing local control. It has been the 
purpose here to raise from the literature a few of the ownership 
alternatives which could have been considered in a riore fully 
developed planning process. Clearly, a sophisticated procedure 
for initiation of service by this new medium would include a 
more careful analysis of the ownership and control alternatives 
and their irrpact on the public interest of each particular 
corrmunity. To say this is not necessarily to indict Richmond's 
handling of the issue. Much remains to be done at the state 
level as well. Several of the alternatives suggested above are 
not available to localities under current law. Some, even if 
available, would be unattractive given other legislative lapses, 
as on the issue of privacy protection, which should in any event 
be addressed. 
If the current prognos.tications concerning the impact of 
cable are accurate to any significant degree, the importance of 
these issues cannot be underestimated . 
. The time for action is now: a radical change in 
the structure . . . of the city and its node of operations 
may be possible for only a short while longer.126 
Perhaps, on the other hand, interest in corrmunity involvement 
will dim:insh after a short operation of basic cable service, 
thereby ending the demand or the need for public use which is 
now seen by the industry as merely "interference. 11127 Perhaps, 
126Ib"d 9 1. • ' p. . 
127Leavens, pp. 133-134. 
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given this uncertain future and legal and political framework, 
public interest consideratiop.s at this stage make Virginia local 
franchises tmWise. This is especially true since a grant of a 
public franchise can bind the city to its choices for m:iny 
years, particularly considering contract implications, and since 
resistance of renewal can be economically and politically 
difficult.128 
The purpose here, however, is not only to raise these 
issues, but analyze their potential impact on the nature of 
cable in the Virginia environment. One of the above organi-
zational alternatives with particular relevance to that point is 
that of regional networking. 
128Leavens, p. 136; and 'Whitley, p. 417. 
CHAPTER 4· 
REGIONAL NETWORKING - A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE 
Special purpose districts have been generally defined as 
" that fonn of political corporation which has a continuing 
but indefinite existence, independent of other fonns of local 
goverrnrent, with limited geographical scope, and limited purposes. 11129 
Such districts offer an effective and efficient neans of providing 
or regulating regional services with centralized planning, and 
without annexation or burdening any one jurisdiction.130 
Similarly, if that regional service is provided by a private 
proprietor, it is spared the effects of operating under several 
different local regulatory authorities. They are especially 
functional with those services, such as cable television, in 
which there is a potential for a high degree of participation by 
system users in decisions concerning service and for staff 
expertise. This is true since such situations offer inherent 
programning, ethical, and professional standards, and control 
against unfair limitation of services or bureaucratic stiffling 
of user participation in system decisionmaking. The possibility 
of the development of expertise on governing boards is also 
increased. Flexibility of service areas is provided when 
129John E. Juergensrneyer, "Special Purpose Taxation Districts: 
Corning or Going?" University of Richmond Law Review (Fall 1976): 87, 
90, 98. 
130Ibid. 
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jurisdictional b01.mdaries themselves are irrelevant to service 
objectives. This is especia,lly true when rural areas rrust also 
be served, since this is possible with a relatively lower overall 
cost to the taxpayer. Under certain technological limitations, 
this IIE.y, in fact, be the only feasible IIEniler of serving rural 
areas. Generally, the effects of interjurisdictional disputes 
are diminished, and the coordination of services of divided or 
sIIE.11 corrm.mities, as well as their general tm.ity, are encouraged.131 
Against that background, it is readily apparent that the approach 
to cable television franchising taken in Virginia has not been 
statewide or regional, either in policy or practice, but rather 
has been limited within jurisdictional boundaries unrelated and 
historically irrelevant to a twentieth century technology, or to 
the technological rquirements of, or the conrnunity resources 
made available by, the rrediurn. In addition to any disadvantages 
of the special district rrechanism that would be the vehicle for 
a regional approach, it is likely that the historical and poli-
tical chauvinism of Virginia localities are also to blame. 
Nonetheless, franchising within regions can result in 
several improvements in the quality of cable service. Inter-
connections between subdistricts within the franchise, or 
between sIIE.11 franchises within a region, can allow public 
access and corrm...mity prograrrming at the neighborhood level 
targeted for areas of similar ethnic, cultural, or economic 
characteristics, whether or not they are physically adjacent, or 
131Ibid.' pp. 89, 90, 96. 
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related to jurisdictional botm.daries.132 Obviously, such an 
arrangement would increase the number of viewers for the entire 
network, as opposed to the audience of individual systems in 
each jurisdiction, thereby allowing the high costs of specialized 
prograrrming to be spread over a larger number of subscribers. 
This is especially i.rrportant since the proportion of homes 
actually reached by cable relative to the broadcast m:=dia must 
be expected to remain low for some time.133 As m=ntioned above, 
a regional network of subsystems also could help to mitigate the 
problem of cross-subsidization for areas, such as rural conmunities, 
where the system would otherwise lack feasibility, a practice 
which worked well in the electrical and telephone industries 
with their relatively lower capital costs. The fact that such 
costs make this tm.likely with cable at this tine will also be 
lessened as technology develops and once the front end capital 
expenditures of particular systems have been covered.134 For 
instance, it would have been much rrore efficient and economically 
feasible to plan and i.rrplement system growth in a regional 
arrangem:=nt in the Ricbm:md area to rural areas as population 
density changes drastically over the next fifteen years. This 
is especially important when it is realized that a certain 
am:>tm.t of rural subsidization is required to serve isolated 
cormn.mities which are derrographically attractive, such as Brandermill 
132Baer, pp. 33-36. 
133Leland L. Johnson, "The Social Effects of Cable Television," 
San Francisco, Cal., 1975 (Mim:=ographed), pp. 4, 7-8; and Baer, p. 186. 
136..-~Noll, p. 197. 
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in Chesterfield Cotmty. This is also true of areas that are of 
political necessity for govep:ring body members from rural 
areas, and therefore ITn.lSt be served, but which are economically 
or technically unfeasible, such as M"atoaca and Ettrick in the 
same cOLmty. There probably is no better example of the extent 
to which regional cooperation could increase system feasibility 
than the fact that the inclusion of the City of Colonial Heights 
could substantially improve the economic factors involved in 
this very expensive capital project of extending service to the 
Petersburg area from Riclmmd. 135 Also, there is within such a 
system no technological justification for concentrated ownership, 
thereby allowing fragmented ownership as a viable objective 
which addresses social and economic issues. This may be true, 
for instance, in those m:Jllopoly situations which can present 
antitrust problems, it being sorrewhat easier to avoid those 
problems 'When many subdistrict franchises are being granted than 
when there is only one for the entire service area. Such frag-
mentation would also allow rrore objective manipulation of system 
size and comparison of system perfonnance.136 The benefits of 
networking, however, should not be expected to be readily apparent. 
For instance, the large system which such a network would tmite 
only could encourage local prograrrming in a syrribiotic manner. 
Local prograrrming will only be attractive to operators 'When 
there is a large viewer coverage, which, except for a few large 
135rnterview, Micas. 
136Babe, p. 56. 
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cities, is unlikely to develop without networking. Networking 
of existing adjacent systems separately owned will be achieved, 
however, only upon proof of enough potential profit to warrant 
the difficult process of achieving cost sharing and techno-
logical agreements. 137 The profit situation, however, is 
clouded, since any economy of scale for local progranming would 
be highly sensitive to fractionalization if reduced to the 
neighborhood level,138 wtiich is an opportunity networking would 
not only provide, but would for social and political reasons 
encourage. 
Cable system feasibility is not a simple issue to analyze. 
System size is frequently a relatively unimportant consideration, 
as is evidenced by the.operation of two separate systems under 
three franchises in the relatively underpopulated Tricities 
area. It must be kept in mind that cable television suffers 
from certain diseconomies of scale by its very nature. The 
optimal system would probably serve one hundred thousand sub-
scribers with seventy miles of cable, which would only result 
from a highly unlikely density.139 Small systems are actually 
137Johnson, p. 8. 
138Noll, p. 200. 
139Babe, p. 37 ; quoting Leonard Good, "An Econometric Model 
of the Canadian Cable Television Industry and the Effects of CRTC 
Regulation (Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1974), pp. 
60-74. 
The age of these statistics might undennine their 
current accuracy. Technological advances, resulting in 
both lower capital. costs, but also in higher system cost 
due to added services, could have affected sorrewhat the 
feasibility of small systems either way in the last six 
years. 
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more efficient in many circumstances than large, but a mininn.lm 
size of one hmdred, fifty ro two htmdred miles of plant, or 
given the typical situation, approximately forty thousand 
potential subscribers, is usually required. l40 Miles of plant 
is actually the best measure of system size, since it eliminates 
the population density variable, but there a number of other 
factors which must be considered. For instance: 
1. fixed investment per mile increases as the number of 
miles increases; 
2. fixed investment per household falls off sharply as 
systems grow to approximately thirty thousand subscribers, but 
then becomes constant; 
3. fixed investment per potential subscriber declines 
rapidly as population density rises mtil arotmd one hmdred, 
fifty households per mile; 
4. in order to obtain the lowest possible investment per 
subscriber, a pentetration rate of over fifty percent of house-
holds passed is required; and 
5. operating costs, excluding depreciation, fall as 
system size approaches two hmdred miles, but if depreciation is 
included, and tmeconomically small plants (those mder forty 
miles) are excluded, operating costs actually rise as system 
size increases. 141 
140Babe, pp. 56, 27. 
141Ibid.' pp. 27, 36-37. 
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While such economic analysis for Virginia systems is 
beyond the scope of this pap.er, it can be said that, while the 
issue of system size cannot be used to justify large regional 
systems, it certainly cannot automatically be used to discount 
the viability of small subdistricts. This, of course, only 
addresses economic considerations. It says nothing of the 
social benefits to be gained. 
While population density is not usually the best indicator 
of potential system or subsystem feasibility, there is evidence 
that, pending forseeable technological developments, rnininrum 
efficient size is approximately three hundred, fifty homes per 
square mile.142 Interestingly, the Tricities area jurisdictions, 
which might be suspected of being potentially the least feasible, 
individually or as subsystems, have the following number of 
households per square mile: 
Petersburg 645 
Hopewell 782 
Colonial Heights 741 
Prince George 29 
Dinwiddie 14 
The three cities are considerably above the suggested 
minimal limit; and when it is considered that system expansion 
into the colITlties would be limited to suburban areas, as has 
been done by franchise in Prince George recently, it is apparent 
that this area theoretically could support several systems or 
l42Allenby, pp. 43-44. 
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subsysterns.143 In a similar situation in Northern Virginia, the 
Cable Television Infonnation. Center has found Falls Church with 
a population of approximately twenty thousand to be suitable for 
a separate systern.144 
In technical tenns, the regional approach is possible.145 
"While service quality dinTinishes with distance from the headend, 
so does that of all competing broadcast media. Long distance 
cable transmission is possible either through microwave trans-
mission, as in Chesterfield, or through "supertnmk" systems, 
which are specially designed for low frequency use to minimize 
signal loss over long distances which are impractical in main 
systems due to the need for expensive frequency conversion 
equipment for subscriber use, to ''hubs" in distant corrmunities. 146 
Satellite connection of large regional or national networks is 
even possible.147 Additionally, the use of cascades of fifty or 
more recently developed amplifiers can minimize noise and dis-
tortion over regional metropolitan distances. With such currently 
available technology, system runs of twenty to twenty-five miles 
are possible with enough remairiing signal strength to feed a 
regular cable distribution system. 148 
143rnterview, Martha Burton, Petersburg, Va., 15 December 1980. 
144william F. Roeder, Jr. , to C. Edward Roettger, Jr. , 14 
November 1980. 
145Baer, p. 188. 
146cunningham, pp. 211, 227, 241; and Johnson, pp. 7-8. 
147Johnson, p. 8. 
148cunn.ingham, pp. 11, 242. 
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While density of population has been frequently cited as a 
determining factor in Virginia system feasibility, this is not, 
• 
as has been seen, necessarily the case. Penetration is the key 
variable according to rrost analysts. Fixed costs and those 
related to the number of system miles account for approximately 
three-fourths of capital cost and imre for operation. The cost 
of adding additional subscribers is relatively small. Use of 
penetration as a determinant changes the feasibility focus 
primarily to difficult market analysis of the impact of various 
services on consumer uses. 149 
The Chesterfield and Fairfax County experiences offer 
evidence of this point. At the beginning, administrators felt 
that the jurisdictions' population densities were too low to 
support state-of-the-art systems, but proceeded only because of 
the fear of political repercussions should other area localities 
offer a service '\Nhich they could not. In the Fairfax situation, 
technological developm2Ilts making additional services feasible 
have mitigated the problem, as is evidenced by a large number of 
very interested potential operators. In Chesterfield, a franchise 
area including approximately ninety-five percent of the county's 
households is expected to operate effectively, with a penetration 
rate to this point of over eighty percent, as compared to a 
national average of approximately fifty percent. In both cases, 
the derrographic characteristics of these basically middle class 
l49Noll, p. 153. 
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corrm.mities, with a population economically capable of using 
cable service and constituting an attractive market, but not 
having access to the broader range of entertainment services 
available in wealthier corrmunities, were probably determative. 150 
It is interesting that subdistricting would enable nore 
flexible manipulation of service to rreet such derIDgraphic con-
siderations. More importantly, hOW"ever, it is apparent that the 
often stated concern about regional systems, that being that 
economically tmjustifiable sparsely populated areas would have 
to be served, is also of questionable relevance. 
Since localities in Virginia are "creatures of the state," 
it is incumbent on the State to provide the statutory authority 
for regional cooperation. Again, a situation exists in which 
the legal framework presents nore of an opporttmity then has 
been taken, but less than is necessary, apparently, to encourage, 
much less require, such an approach. 
Article VII, §§ 2 and 3 .of the Virginia Constitution 
provides: 
The General Assembly shall provide by general law 
for the organization, government, pOW'ers, change of 
b0tmdaries, consolidation, and dissolution of counties, 
cities, towns, and regional governments .... 
The General Assembly may also provide by special 
act for the organization, government, and pOW'ers of any 
cotmty, city, town, or regional government, including 
such pOW'ers of legislation, taxation, and assessment as 
150rnterview, Micas; Interview, Golden; and Washington 
Post, 27 December 1979, sec. Va., p. 3. 
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the General Assembly may detennine, but no such special 
act shall be adopted which provides for the extension or 
contraction of botmdc\,ries of any cotmty, city, or town. 
Every law providing for the organization of a 
regional government shall, in addition to any other 
requirements imposed by the General Assembly, require the 
approval of the organization of the regional government 
by a majority vote of the qualified voters voting thereon 
in each cotmty and city which is to participate in the 
regional government and of the voters voting thereon in a 
part of a cotmty or city where only the part is to participate. 
The General Assembly may provide by general law or 
special act that any cotmty, city, town, or other tmit of 
government may exercise any of its powers or perfonn any 
of its functions and may participate in the financing 
thereof jointly or in cooperation with the Conrnonwealth 
or any other tmit of governrrent within or without the 
Conmmwealth. The General Assembly may provide by general 
law or special act for transfer to or sharing with a 
regional goverrnnent of any services, functions, and 
related facilities of any cotmty, city, town, or other 
tmit or government within the botmdaries of such regional 
government. 
Thus, the General Assembly may provide for regional government 
subject to the referendum requirement, which has been am:mg the 
many factors discouraging such action by localities to this 
point. It might be conjectured that cable television would 
present such an attractive service to the electorate that it 
would constitute one of the few situations in which use of the 
regional government approach might be politically realistic. 
This is tmlikely for a number of reasons, annng them the General 
Assembly's response to Article VII, § 2. Article 3, Chapter 34, 
Title 15.1 of the Code of Virginia, the Virginia Area Develop-
ment Act, requires not only the concurrence of the majority of 
those voting within each jurisdiction, 151 but also limits 
15lva. Code § 15.1-1420. 
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participation unnecessarily, and inappropriately for cable 
purposes, within Planning Di,stricts; and requires that a majority 
of the population in the District be included. 152 't-bre damaging, 
however, is Va. Code § 15.1-1422 (b), which states: 
The plan shall assure that the services to be 
initially provided by the service district shall be of 
sufficient number and importance to produce a meaningful 
goverrnnental unit and program and shall provide the 
framework of goverrnnent for the eventual performance by 
the service district of all of the functions and services 
which are appropriate for perfonnance on a district-wide 
basis. 
This not only leaves open, but also encourages, consolidation of 
a wide range of local services once any one service, such as 
cable, has been established on a regional basis, thereby under-
mining the political viability of any such plan. Of course, 
this provision could be amended, and, since total consolidation 
of jurisdictions is provided for elsewhere in the Code, one IIll.lSt 
question the necessity for regional goverrnnent provisions being 
so similar in ult:llnate result.153 Fortunately, a nuch older 
approach, also provided for in the Constitution, is possible. 
Va. Code§ 15.1-21 (a) provides that 
[a]ny power or powers, privileges or authority 
exercised or capable of exercise by any political sub-
division of this State may be exercised . . . jointly 
with any political subdivision of this State and, with 
any political subdivision of another State. 
This raises several possibilities. As an aside, the last provision 
of the subsection leaves to Northern Virginia the possibility of 
152va. Code § 15.1-1421. 
153see, for instance, Va. Code§§ 15.1-1071 to 1083, 
15.1-1130 to 1148. 
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participating in a Washington area network about which there is 
currently sorre speculation.154 'M:>re importantly though, perhaps 
• localities could delegate their franchising authority in a 
regional mutual-exercise-of-powers agreement. Dillon's Rule does 
not prohibit the delegation of local authority.155 The authority 
to do so is of some question, however, since there is specific 
Constitutional restriction on the exercise of the franchising 
authority by cities and towns, and Va. Code § 15.1-21 (b) would 
probably require each jurisdiction to take the "appropriate 
action." The doubt raised concerning joint franchising would 
probably be enough to prohibit such action under the Dillon 
Rule. This probably would not preclude, however, adjacent 
jurisdictions from reaching the sane franchise decision and then 
providing for joint regulation pursuant to Va. Code § 15.1-21 
(c) (2). 
Thus, State law offers regional alternatives, but certainly 
does not off er any of such specific relevance to the cable 
situation as to encourage it. There are some legal situatons, 
however, which do offer such encouragement. Before any county, 
for instance, can reach a cable franchise agreement, it must 
come to some agreement with other franchising authorities within 
the Comty. For instance, the Town of Vierma claimed the authority 
to grant franchises within the town prior to comty action at 
one point in the Fairfax process. 156 Were the situation as 
154Interview, Jacks and Evans. 
1551974 Rep. Att'y. Gen. 103. 
156washington Post, 10 July 1979, sec. C, p. 3. 
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complex in any Virginia localities as in those in sorre other 
states, the state might be f9rced into mJre aggressively regu-
lating franchising generally and service areas specifically. 157 
Prince George's County, Maryland,with its twenty-eight munici-
palities, at least one of which has attempted to affect the 
course of county-wide cable television by granting a separate 
franchise of questionable feasibility, offers a good example. 
This situation could be reversed by the State and used to 
require that local franchises receive State approval, as to any 
number of requirements, but specifically as to service area, 
before such franchises becorre operative. 
Legal and practical alternatives for regional organization 
do not guarantee, however, that such an approach is politically 
viable. The history of special districts in Virginia offers a 
subject area on which the General Assembly has been particularly 
reluctant to depart from ''known patterns.'' As urban problems 
have grown beyond city boundaries in Virginia, especially since 
World War II, increased interest in regional approaches has 
developed. The General Assembly has provided by special act for 
the joint exercise of local authority by special districts, and 
local goverrunents have also participated in such arrangements 
under general law.158 The objectives and results have not 
always been encouraging, however. One of the primary purposes 
157washington Post, 10 January 1980, sec. Md., p. 1. 
158Howard, pp. 791, 823, 865. 
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has been to circtnTIVent constitutional limitations on local debt, 
for instance, through local service contracts with authorities. 
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that such contracts do not 
constitute a present local debt in the full anot.mt when they are 
for the perfonnance of an essential public service, which cable 
at this point almost certainly is not; and when payment is in 
instalbn?nts made as service is rendered.159 It is also true 
that special districts were even authorized during the control 
of state government by the Byrd organization, but only as an 
effort to ~et the demands of local governments for services for 
which the state was unwilling to incur debt or to have the 
localities do so directly. It can be seen then, that in creating 
special districts, the usual fiscal advantages have been offset 
by the fact that debts of the authorities have not been backed 
by the credit of the state, thereby subjecting bonds issued to 
higher interest rates. 160 In a capital intensive service such 
as cable, financing considerations such as this can be crucial 
to initial feasibility, as h8.s been discussed above. It should 
also be noted that special districts in Virginia have been 
created for the m:>st part for perfonnance of functions tradi-
tionally recognized as having a legitima.te public purpose, and 
with cable that status has not been obtained. 
Of further mitigation, in the Virginia setting, of the 
advantages of special district cable franchising or operation 
is the lack of independence from general purpose local government 
159Tuid. ' pp. 865-866. 
16C\Jilkinson, pp. 191-192; and Howard, p. 865. 
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that any district would enjoy. For instance, the General 
Asserribly has specifically declined to authorize taxation by 
special districts, despite a Metropolitan Areas Study Corrmission 
recormendation in favor of such an approach. Instead, districts 
may only assess general purpose local governrnents. 161 In this 
way, one of the direct links of responsibility between cable 
system users and management is lost. A further potential road-
block to the use of special districts in the Virginia cable 
experience is the of ten stated claim that their creation leads 
to fragmentation of governrnent. 162 It should be noted, however, 
that as this applies to cable regulation, and franchising 
generally, this criticism depends upon the perspective one 
takes. It could just as easily be maintained that the current 
constitutional delegation of the franchise authority to cities 
and towns fragments an important state governmental function. 
In fact, this important issue 'Was debated at the 1901-1902 
Constitutional convention, based upon a concern that this dele-
gation of authority could weaken the power of the Corrrmnwealth 
to control economic growth and encourage the development of 
statewide projects. This argunent prevailed at least partially, 
in that counties were denied general franchising authority. 163 
Nonetheless, for many reasons it remains questionable whether or 
161Juergensrreyer, p. 88; Howard, p. 820; and Va. Code 
§ 15.1-1400. 
162Howard, p. 865. 
163rbid. , pp. 848-850. 
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not a regional organizational framework for the operation and 
regulation of cable television in Virginia, whether operation is 
by the private or the public sector, is politically realistic. 
This is true despite the fact that such districts would be IDJre 
politically viable than regional government, which interferes to 
a greater extent with the functional and territorial integrity 
of traditional local jurisdictions. 164 
Virginia need not take an innovative approach in order to 
impose a statewide framework and policy on cable television 
franchising. Eleven states have :imposed sorre regulatory authority 
over cable franchising. Eight do so through their public utility 
commission, which, as has been seen, Virginia does not. Most, 
however, do so only in limiting local decisionrnaking, as with 
Hawaii, Connecticut, and New Jersey. At least three states have 
independent agencies for regulating the franchise process, for 
instance, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York. 165 
Such state regulations provide a number of alternatives 
for regional approaches. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, 
while state corrrnissioners are given authority to establish 
technical stanadards and standard franchise provisions, to 
regulate rates, and to require certificates of compliance with 
those standards, little authority is given to regulate service 
164Juergensrneyer, pp. 97-98. 
165navid CMen Korte, 11Cable Franchising in the Preferred 
Approach," Public Managerrent, July 1980, p. 18. 
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areas, and the primary franchising authority remains with the 
localities.166 Connecticut aoes provide for annual meetings of 
regional advisory councils with franchisees though,167 and 
Massachusetts at least encourages subdistricting within juris-
dictions by defining "area or areas to be served" as including 
"a municipality or a portion of a m.micipality in order to 
reflect within municipal boundaries, the various economic, 
cultural, geographic and cormunity interests of the citizens 
residing therein. 168 
Other states, however, take an even m::>re aggressive 
approach. In Hawaii, the Director of Regulatory Agencies has 
the authority to grant permits for cable television systerns. 169 
Applications for such permits must state the service area to be 
covered, and "(i]n determining the area which is to be serviced 
. . . , the director shall take into account the geography and 
topography of.the proposed service area, and both the present 
operations and the planned and potential expansion of the 
applicant's and other CATV companies.170 The director also has 
the duty to promulgate criteria.for the designation of service 
l66connecticut Code §§ 16-38 et seq.; and Massachusetts 
Code §§ 166~:1 et seq. 
167conn. Code § 16-331. 
16~ss. Code § 166A:l (f). 
169Hawaii Code § 440G-4. 
170rbid., §§ 440G-6 and 8 (a)(2). 
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areas.171 The State Division of Public Utilities and Carriers 
in Rhode Island has similar authority to grant certificates of 
compliance and to impose standards as to territory of operation.172 
In New Jersey, the State Board of Utility Corrmissioners 
may deny a state certificate of approval for either technical or 
f:inancial reasons, and, roost importantly for the purpose here, 
may direct more or less coverage of service area, if the impact 
of the application's approval "WOuld be to impede developmmt of 
adequate service or create unreasonable duplication. Mrnicipal 
consent is still required, but ma.y not be arbitrarily withheld.173 
New York's Comnission on Cable Television is charged with 
the responsibility to "stirmllate and encourage cooperative 
arrangerrents am:mg organizations, institutions and rrn.micipalities 
in development of regional educational, instructional and public 
affairs prograrrrning," a mandate only somewhat broader than that 
of the Virginia statute, and also to "cooperate with rrn.mici-
palities to facilitate multiple corrmunity cable television 
systems. 11174 Franchises must still be granted by municipalities, 
and, while they are not valid t.m.til a state certificate of 
confirmation is granted, apparently that certificate may not be 
denied on the grot.m.ds of service area.175 The Cormri.ssion may 
later, however, order the interconnection or coordination of 
operation of approved systems.176 
171Ibid., § 440G-12 (2). 
172Rhode Island Code §§ 39-19 3 and 4. 
173N.J. § 48:5A-17b; 48-SA-22. 
174N.Y. § 815 (7) and (8). 
175Ibid., §§ 819 and 821. 176Ibid., § 823. 
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Minnesota takes one of the rrost affinnative regional 
approaches. That legislature has fol.Illd that cable corrmuni-
cations is in a state of rapid growth and corporate consoli-
dation and that during that process it should conf onn to regional 
and statewide service objectives; that area-wide service should 
be encouraged, while concentration of ownership is discouraged; 
that many local governments lack the expertise and resources to 
plan for and secure the benefits of cable systems, or to protect 
subscribers and others in franchise negotiations; that there is 
a need for a statewide service plan and standard franchise 
practices ; and that it IIUJSt be assured that ". . . rrn.micipal 
franchising results in camm.mication across ~tropolitan areas 
and in neighborhood corrmunities in larger m.micipalities."177 
The Minnesota Cable Comm.mications Board is charged with setting 
standards for establishing or altering service areas, is given 
the authority to approve special territories on application of 
municipalities or cable operators, and may order the inter-
connection of systems. 178 A regional system in the Twin Cities 
area is specifically required by state law. 179 A procedure is 
provided for extension of core service areas, including the 
joint exercise of powers of m.micipalities in accepting the 
earlier franchise of a core service unit in another m.micipa-
lity, l80 and allows joint franchising and regulation by 
177Minnesota Code § 238.01. 
l78Ibid., §§ 238.05 (6) and (7), 238.06 (5). 
179Minn. Code§ 238.05 (2)(c). 
180Ibid.' § 238.17. 
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m.micipalities, each of which v,;ould contribute a council member 
and a citizen member to a joint comnission for that purpose. 181 
An interesting provision is the fact that 
[f]or the purposes of assisting in the :implementation 
of sections 238.01 and 238.17, the IIEtropolitan council 
and regional development corrrnissions of the state may 
engage in a program of research and study concerning 
interconnections, cable territories, regional use of 
cable cOITilUJilications and all other aspects 'vllich may be 
of regional concern.182 
Such a mandate could easily be given to planning district corrrnissions 
in Virginia. 
It should be noted that even in Minnesota, local prerogatives 
are not totally abrogated, as municipalities continue to have 
the franchising authority. Franchises must be approved by the 
Board before they become effective though.l83 
The question of service area and system fragmentation is 
not only recognized as fundamentally a part of the franchise 
procedure from its inception by other state statutes, but also 
in the literature. Walter S. Baer in Cable Television: A 
Handbook for Decisionmaking, recognizes three related questions 
of major importance which should be addressed early in the 
process: 
1. geographic coverage; 
2. coordination with neighboring jurisdictions for 
efficient service and interconnection; and 
181Ibid., § 238.08. 
182rbid., § 238.10. 
183Ibid.' § 238.09. 
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3. the question of multiple or single ownership in the 
area. Such issues are rrost apequately addressed in conjtmction 
with regional planning corrrnissions.184 
The experience in the three Virginia areas studied is 
quite the contrary. The provisions of the ordinances reflect 
little concern for regional issues. The record does not in-
dicate that any consideration has been given to regional net-
working or subdistricting, except for speculation concerning the 
distant future, and, in point of fact, the possibility of 
operation on a regional basis by MSO's seeking additional 
franchises has rrore often than not had negative impact on their 
proposal's chances.185 
Legislative response to the networking issue, to the 
extent it exists, is as follows: 
Northern Virginia 
Arlington Code § 41-4, offers perhaps the best example, 
as follows: 
(d) The company may be required to interconnect 
its system with any other broadband corrrm.mications facility 
operating in an adjacent·territory. Such interconnection 
shall be made within sixty (60) days of a request made by 
an appropriately designated cotmty agency. The agency 
shall have the responsibility of coordinating such inter-
connections to insure technical compatibility between the 
systems to be interconnected. For good cause shown the 
company may request and the board may grant reasonable 
extensions of time to comply with the requirements. 
(e) For the purpose of permitting the simultaneous 
transmission into any one or 110re subdistricts of isolated, 
discrete signals of cotmty channels, public charmels, and 
184Baer, pp. 78-79. 
185rnterview, Micas; Interview, Fmrich; and Interview, 
Jacks and Evans. 
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company channels, the company shall upon request of an 
appropriate designated official of the cotm.ty, arrange 
the system so that it• is capable of such transmission 
to subdistricts, the nurriber and botm.daries of such shall 
be as detennined by the board upon reconrnendation of the 
agency. The company shall t.mdertake the development of a 
plan to divide the cot.mty into the greatest nurriber of 
subdistricts practicable, which subdistricts may be 
variously combined so as to constitute neighborhood com-
rrn.mities, school districts, Congressional districts, 
State Senate and Assembly districts, and the like, for 
the simultaneous transmission into any one or nore of 
such subdistricts of such isolated, discrete signals. 
Such plan shall be submitted to the cot.mty within a 
reasonble time after the request is made. The cotm.ty 
shall approve or nodify such plan giving due regard to 
economic, technological and engineering considerations. 
Such plan shall be implemented and the system be capable 
of simultaneous transmission of such isolated signals. . 
There are problems with this, however. Va. Code·§ 15.1-
23.1 raises the issue of cost allocation t.mder (d); and nore 
importantly, there are currently no plans for subdistricting and 
only speculation about interconnection. 
The Alexandria Code, in § 7B-32, offers the following 
relatively good language, but again with no plans for imple-
mentation, which leads to the suspicion that it is simply 
boilerplate. 
Interconnection. 
A franchisee may interconnect the system with any 
or all other cable television systems in the area if 
otherwise lawful and provided such other system agrees to 
the interconnection. Interconnection of systems may be 
done by direct cable connection, microwave link, satellite 
or other appropriate nethod. 
(a) Upon receiving the directive of the city to 
interconnect, the franchisee shall inrn2diately initiate 
negotiations with the other affected cable television 
system or systems in order that costs may be shared 
equally for both construction and operation of the inter-
connection link. 
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(b) The city council may grant reasonable extensions 
of time to interconnect or rescind its request to interconnect 
upon petition by the .franchisee to the city council. The 
city council shall grant the request if it finds that the 
franchisee has negotiated in good faith and the cost of 
interconnection would cause an unreasonable increase in 
subscriber rates. 
(c) No interconnection shall take place without 
prior approval of the administrator. A franchisee in 
seeking approval for interconnection shall derrXJnstrate 
that all signals to be interconnected will comply with 
FCC technical standards for all classes of signals and 
will result in a low level of distortion. 
(d) The franchisee shall cooperate with any 
interc0IU1ection corporation, regional interconnection 
authority, state or federal regulatory agency which may 
be hereafter established for the purpose of regulating, 
facilitating, financing or otherwise providing for the 
interconnection of cable television systems beyond the 
bot.mdaries of the city. 
The problem of cost allocation, which could thwart any 
plans which might later arise, is again raised here. 
Sec. 7B-43, system design, is also relevant. 
The cable television system shall be installed in 
a manner which will allow each area, if served by a 
separate head-end, to distribute and originate programs 
to not only the area served by the head-end but to 
interconnect with other head-ends, if any, within the 
system in order to send or receive originated prograrrrning 
from or to any one or rrore areas served by other head-
ends within the city. · 
The Fairfax County Code, Chapter 9, Article 7, includes 
the following similar provision: 
Section 3. Extension outside the primary service area. 
(a) A Grantee shall extend its full service 
outside the PSA to any location within the franchise area 
in accordance with the line extension policy incorporated 
into the franchise. 
(b) To the extent that may be allowed by law, the 
County, by resolution, may require a Grantee to interconnect 
its cable television system with other cable television 
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systems or other broadband cormn.mications facilities 
(e.g. , a television corrm.mication network connecting 
public institutions or facilities) located within the 
County. Such interconnection shall be made 'Within ninety 
(90) days of a request made by the County Board of Super-
visors pursuant to such a resolution, or 'Within a longer 
period of time as may be specified by the Board in its 
resolution. 
(c) A Grantee shall make every reasonable effort 
to cooperate 'With cable television franchise holders in 
contiguous conmunities in order to provide cable service 
in areas 'Within the County but outside the Granteee's 
. Primary Service Area. 
(d) The Cornty shall make every reasonable effort 
to cooperate 'With the franchising authorities in contiguous 
corrmunities, and 'With the Grantee, in order to provide 
cable television service in areas outside the Cotmty. 
Riclnrond Area 
The Richrrond ordinance contains no provision for interconnection 
or subdistricting. 
Henrico Ordinance No. 458 (1976), Article V, § 1, D., § 
2, C and D, states that: 
D. 'The Grantee may be required to intercormect 
its cable television system 'With other cable television 
systems or other broadband corrmunications facilities 
located in contiguous corrmunities. Such interconnection 
shall be made within ninety (90) days of a request made 
by the County Board of Supervisors. 
C. Grantee shall make every reasonable effort to 
cooperate 'With cable television franchise holders in 
contiguous communities in order to provide cable service 
in areas within the Cornty but outside the Grantee's 
Initial Franchise Area. 
D. 'The Cornty shall make every reasonable effort 
to cooperate with the franchising authorities in contiguous 
corrmmities, and with the Grantee, in order to provide 
cable television service in areas outside the County. 
A similar provision is included in the Chesterfield 
Ordinance in§§ 7.1-6 (c) and 7.1-(c). 
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Tricities Area 
None of the ord:inances address the issues of regional 
operation or networking of subdistricts. 
In surrrnary, two po:ints can be made. Regional operation 
of a cable system, with networking with:in the system of sub-
districts delineated according to denographic and technical 
standards, offers technological and prograrrrning advantages 
particularly useful in meet:ing the potential public service 
objectives of the medium. Secondly, however, while the legal 
mechanism exists in Virg:inia for such an organization, either of 
public or private system operation, that authority, in its 
current fonn, will not encourage this approach give.."'! political 
realities. Regional cable networking is not possible :in Virginia 
without a departure at the state level from traditional approaches 
to local govennnent. Consequently, this otherwise viable and 
useful organizational alternative rema:ins tm.considered, despite 
examples of action in other states, despite the apparent advan-
tages, and the potential dangers of inaction, and despite the 
failure of local governments to consider these issues on their 
own initiative. 
CONCLUSION 
As Brenda Fox of the NCTA. told the local Government 
Attorneys of Virginia in August, 1980, "technology is ahead of 
the law, and technology is beating the law" in the cable tele-
vision field. This comparison of local regulation of cable 
television in Virginia to alternatives suggested by the literature 
and even the experience in other states, has dem:mstrated this 
to be the case in Virginia. For the IIDst part, the General 
Asserribly has failed to act. As has been seen, when it did so, 
it was only in response to the local initiative offered by 
Arlington County, and local initiative has itself been limited 
due to the legislature's failure to grant sufficient authority 
or support to local government. What has resulted is a regu-
latory scheme in which the legislature has determined that there 
should be regulation in the .public interest, but in which the 
regulation has been left to localities which have neither the 
resources, the legal authority, nor the political inclination, 
to do so effectively and with flexibility. 
In fairness, it can be noted that lack of legislative 
action, even given the potential implications of developm2Ilt of 
cable television, should not be surprising. The considerable 
changes in the technological, economic and legal aspects of the 
medium in the last five years, and the resulting rush for 
95 
96 
franchises, could be expected to engender a cautious response, 
or no response at all, eithe;r- on the basis of ignorance or 
uncertainty. Other aspects of the industry, evimmt in the 
Virginia experience, could also elicit a limited response. It 
has been observed, concerning national regulation, that 
[i]n a field such as corrmmications where the 
interests of powerful industry forces frequently collide 
with one another as well as with the interests of the 
general public, nothing is m:Jre unsettling to many1 lawmakers . . . than the prospect of rrak:ing a law. 86 
Instead, the Congress has chosen to rely on "a variety of infonnal 
techniques in directing and overseeing the activities of the 
F.C.C. ," such as hearings, investigations and studies, despite 
the fact, noted by Chief Justice Burger in U. S. v. Midwest Video, 
that " ... the alm:>st explosive developrrent of CA.TV suggests 
the need for a comprehensive reexamination of the statutory 
scheme . . . . 11187 
What is required in Virginia, however, is not reexamination, 
but comprehensive initial examination. Unfortunately, such has 
not been the experience described here. While it would be 
presumptuous to reach policy canclusions in a field in such 
rapid development and of such an uncertain nature, the Virginia 
experience definitely raises an agenda of issues to be addressed 
at the one level of government which as yet, for the m:Jst part, 
has remained out of the cable regulatory arena. If a decision 
is made that Virginia law should play a direct role in the 
186Erwin G. Krasnow and Lawrence D. Longley, The Politics 
of Broadcast Regulation, 2nd ed. (New York: St. :Martin's Press, 
1978), p. 90. 
187Ibid. 
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future of cable television, then the following legal issues, 
anong many others, would be addressed in the construction of a 
regulatory scheme: 
1. The Virginia Freedom of Infonnation Act could be 
amended to impose guidelines for the franchising process which 
would assure public awareness and impact upon the process, for 
example, by regulating ex parte cormrunications between governing 
body members and bidders, and post-bid submissions of additional 
information and bid amendments. The experiences in Richnnnd and 
Alexandria were illustrative of such due process problems, and, 
on a m::>re positive note, the standards imposed in Chesterfield 
and Falls Church offer examples of local initiative to fill the 
void; 
2. The Virginia Conflict of Interests Act could, at the 
very least, address the issue of public official interest in 
cable finns; 
3. Va. Code § 15.1-23. l could be expanded into a ID'.)re 
comprehensive state cable camnunications policy, imposing a 
mandatory duty upon the localities to regulate, with substantial 
state oversight, thereby removing the serious limitations placed 
on legal authority by the Lafayette and Boulder cases cited 
above. Beyond this, however, an expanded state regulatory 
mandate could be used to fill the vacumn in which local govern-
ments can consider factors irrelevant to cormrunity service by 
cable, such as "rent-a-citizen" political concerns, petty 
interjurisdictional rivalries, and increased local revenue. 
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Other vague standards for perfonnance are offered by the 
franchising process itself, .which is ripe for public confusion 
and litigation, since franchising for the use of public property 
was never intended for application to a rapidly developing 
corrm.mications teclmology. Many of the issues involved in 
Cablecom v. Ricbmmd speak in favor of correcting this short-
coming. Also, flexibility to rreet future technological develop-
ments could be built into the process, a reservation of authority 
rarely seen in the Virginia experience so far; 
4. As a part of this policy, the state could eliminate 
some of the current limitations on local action, as in delineating 
cable corrmunications service districts reasonably related to the 
social impact and teclmological characteristics of the rredium. 
Given the Virginia political environment, it is probably m:>st 
realistic to assume that local governments would continue to 
exercise franchising authority within such districts. Exercise 
of this authority, however, might be subject to state certifi-
cation of compliance with service, networking, and subdistricting 
standards. Among the advantages of such an approach would be 
both the elimination of unrealistic bidding for marginal fran-
chises, in order to establish a "stepping stone" in future 
bidding; and of unrealistic ownership diversity due primarily to 
local jurisdictional rivalries; 
5. In light of the fact that federal technical standards 
may eventually be eliminated, and the fact that even Virginia 
localities with sophisticated staff capabilities are unable to 
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adequately impose such standards, a detennination could be made 
as to the extent to which cqble television is a utility, and to 
which such standards should be prorrrulgated by the S. C. C. That 
is not to say that a new separate conmission or the Public 
Telecormn.m.ications Board might not perf onn this function IlK)re 
appropriately, especially in the event of a legislative deter-
mination that cable services are not a utility, or that the 
issue of deregulation should not also be addressed. Also to be 
considered, if utility status is granted, could be rate regu-
lation, on which the Arlington and Alexandria situations derron-
strate the inability of even sophisticated localities to act, as 
well as the susceptibility of the process to political pressure. 
The financing issue, a consistently important one in this capital 
intensive field, and one with 'Which Virginia localities have, 
alrrost without exception, had difficulty dealing could be examined. 
This last point is especially important, given the rapidly 
mm.m.ting corrroitments of several MSO' s in Virginia in an enter-
prise where little short-tenn profit is available and where 
public purpose demands could legitimately be made on future 
significant profit; and 
6. Various ownership alternatives for Virginia localities 
should be investigated, such as municipal or public authority 
ownership or operation, of either plant of prograrrming or both. 
The alternatives offered in the experience studied here have, 
alrrost without exception, been those presented by the industry. 
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This is not to suggest the nature of effective regulation 
in Virginia, or that deregulation to the fullest possible extent 
might not offer the best alternative. On this point, the 
national experience in carm.mications regulation is enlightening. 
The F. C. C. has tended to regulate in favor of those whom existing 
regulations have rrost benefited, the major entities in the rredia 
status quo as opposed to those requiring innovative approaches 
to technology or new standards for regulation. This has been 
the case largely because any regulator easily can be overwhelmed 
in a field of major technological development and rapidly 
expanding market demand. Such situations, as with citizens band 
radio for example, have lead historically to a reactive regulatory 
role, rather than a guiding one, as the regulator becorres dependent 
itself on the major industries for guidance. 'These situations 
have also lead in many cases, including the Federal regulation 
of cable television, to the stiffling of legislative and regulatory 
action by those industries with the IIDst power to do so, those 
being the industries most heavily invested in m:rintaining the 
current legal and technical environment.188 In this way it is 
possible, although not necessarily certain, that regulation can 
actually have results contrary to the public interest in in-
creased media service. If experience is an accurate guide, it 
cannot be expected that rrore aggressive cable regulation in 
Virginia would be i.rrmtme from this potential pitfall. The 
record described in this paper, in fact, is one replete with 
188Krasnow, pp. 21, 30, 80, 171. 
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acquiescence by local goverrnnents with limited resources to 
industry initiative, and MSQ' s willing to use that situation to 
their benefit to a significant degree. It cannot be guaranteed 
at this point that a rrore aggressive approach at the state level 
would have better support, or be any rrore independent of in-
dustrial influence in attempting to IIEet public objectives. 
Perhaps relatively rroderate regulation is the best that 
can be expected at either the state or local level. Perhaps 
such a limited approach even may be the rrost suited to the 
achieverrent of public objectives. It has been observed in the 
literature that 
the public interest may require in a highly 
complex, politically sensitive and rapidly changing 
industry at rrost a regulatory objective of m:Jdest 
change, flexibility and sensitivity to feedback, and 
a focus on short range goals.189 
In such a situation, it may simply ask too rrnlch to expect 
specific long range goals or dramatic changes of direction. 
Perhaps such a limited process is the best possible, and cer-
tainly it is the rrost likely. Nonetheless, it should include at 
least one actor whose primary objective is the protection and 
fostering of the public interest. As has been seen above, even 
the possibility of a reactive regulatory role is increasingly 
threatened in Virginia, as local governments fail to retain the 
authority to meet technological developments with a flexible 
response. This study has discovered little action on the part 
189Krasnow, pp. 187-194. 
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of the Cormonwealth to discourage this practice, either by 
enhancing the competence of the localities to regulate, or by 
increasing the awareness of this potential problem by imposing 
its consideration as a part of the franchising process. The 
current situation does not appear to be one designed to regulate 
in the public interest in a limited, practical marmer. Rather, 
it appears to be one in which a decision has been made, largely 
by default, to regulate, but to do so hardly at all. 
The future of cable television in Virginia for at least a 
decade has to a large extent been set within the last four 
years, as many major jurisdictions have awarded franchises. In 
the three major metropolitan areas studied here, Arlington, 
Alexandria, Henrico, Richm:md and Chesterfield have issued 
franchises for state-of-the-art systems, and Petersburg, Hopewell, 
and Colonial Heights are bom.d for several years to antiquated 
systems. If the Corrm:mwealth is to play any significant role in 
what little remains of the process, then General Assembly action, 
as opposed to minimal reaction, is imperative. Theoretically, 
the decision could justifiably be in favor of any number of 
regulatory alternatives, including even a terrporary IIDratorium 
on cable system authorizations m.til basic policy decisions can 
be made and i.mtil the future of the rredium becorres more certain. 
This could be justified on the grom.ds that the situation at 
present is too uncertain to allow the substantial bargaining 
away of public rights, or major investment of private or public 
capital. As to regulation itself, the extrem=s rm. from total 
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state preemption, to total deregulation except for the rrnst 
nrinirnal standards for the use of public rights of way. Rea-
listically, the options are much rrore limited. Just as there is 
at the state level a legal void as to cable regulation, there is 
a related political one, also evident in this paper. Greater 
authority for the localities to regulate, or to take advantage 
of regional alternatives, is unlikely given Virginia's traditional 
approach to local governmental authority. Under the principles 
and experience which underlie the Dillon Rule, local iniative, 
even if not specifically prohibited, is certainly not encouraged, 
as any effort of Fairfax County to operate its own system will 
most likely dem:mstrate. This is also not to say that past 
experience indicates that authority given would be used, as with 
regional franchising, and given the traditional parochial.outlook 
of Virginia localities. 
That decision, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
What is apparent, based upon this study of the issues of regulatory 
authority, expertise, and organization alone, is the lack of any 
comprehensive analysis of the Virginia regulatory environment for 
cable television, and the inability of local government to regulate 
effectively in the field without such guidance. 
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